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establishment of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
followed in 1990 and 1991, respectively. In their wake, China's
securities regulatory authority and Chinese courts faced the
problem of how best to tackle various forms of securities fraud in
order to protect the interests of investors and to maintain the
integrity of China's securities market. Between September 2001
and January 2003, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) issued three
circulars instructing local people's courts on how to deal with civil
compensation claims arising from securities market fraud.' On
January 15, 2002, intermediate people's courts designated by the
SPC began to accept and hear civil compensation cases arising
from false statements on China's securities market, marking the
beginning of civil litigation in the people's court in relation to
these claims. 2 This development, welcomed by the market and
investors, makes it possible for investors to claim losses suffered
as a result of false statements. However, there are problems and
limitations in the circulars issued by the SPC, which raise serious
concerns among judges, academics, and practitioners. This paper
primarily examines the procedural rules prescribed by the third
circular of the SPC, "Several Provisions of the Supreme People's
Court on Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Arising from False
Statement on the Securities Market," with a focus on the
limitations of these rules. 3

China's securities regulatory authority has been active in the
Zuigao remin fayuan guanyu she zhengquan minshi peichang anjian zan buyu
shouli de tongzhi [The Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Temporary Refusal of
Filings of Securities-Related Civil Compensation Cases] (Sept. 21, 2001); Zuigao renmin
fayuan guanyu shouli zhengquan shichang yin xujiachengshu yinfa de minshi qinquan
jiufen anjian youguan wenti de tongzhi [The Notice of the Supreme People's Court on
Relevant Issues of Filing of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Arising From False Statement on
the Securities Market] (Jan. 15, 2002); Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli zhengquan
shichang yin xujiachengshu yinfa de minshi peichang anjian de ruogan guiding [Several
Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Arising
From False Statement on the Securities Market] (Jan. 9, 2003).
2 The Second Circular of the SPC designated certain intermediate people's courts
to accept and hear civil compensation cases arising from false statement, starting from
January 15, 2002, the effective date of the Second Circular of the SPC.
3 Several Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Hearing Civil
Compensation Cases Arising from False Statement on the Securities Market
(promulgated by Judicial Comm. of Sup. People's Ct., Jan. 9, 2003, effective Feb. 1,
2003) P.R.C. LAWS & REGS (http://www.lawinfochina.com) [hereinafter Rules of the

SPC].
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past decade, tackling various forms of securities fraud on the
market by means of administrative penalties and criminal charges,
with an aim to protect investors and the integrity of the securities
market. 4 The 1993 Provisional Measures on Prohibition of
Securities Fraud were introduced specifically to deal with insider
trading, market manipulation, false disclosure of information, and
other forms of securities fraud. ' Similar provisions were
promulgated in the 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing
and Trading, 6 the 1993 Company Law,7 and the 1998 Securities
Law,8 along with other securities rules and regulations issued by
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. For the first time, the
revised 1997 Criminal Law created securities-related criminal
offenses that principally targeted various forms of securities
fraud.9 As a result, many firms and individuals who committed
securities fraud have been investigated and punished by the CSRC,
the principal regulator of the securities industry in China.' ° When
4 See ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CHINA 117-25, 187-206 (2000).

5 Promulgated by then-Securities Committee of the State Council on September 2,
1993, and was effective immediately.
6 These measures were promulgated by then-Securities Committee of the State
Council on April 22, 1993, and became effective immediately. According to Article 72,
those who commit insider trading are subject to a fine between 50,000 to 500,000 yuan
in addition to confiscation of illegal gain (as of October 21, 2005, 1 Chinese yuan is
equal to 0.123741 U.S. dollars) [1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and
Trading].
7 Adopted by the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress
(NPC) on December 29, 1993, effective from July 1, 1994, and amended by the Standing
Committee of the 9th NPC on December 25, 1999. Article 212 states that where
companies provide shareholders and the public with false financial reports or conceal
material facts, the person in charge or other directly responsible person shall be fined
between 10,000 and 100,000 yuan and charged where crimes are committed.
8 Adopted by the Standing Comm. of the 9th NPC on December 29, 1998, and
effective July 1, 1999. Article 5 states generally that securities fraud, insider trading and
market manipulation is prohibited [hereinafter 1998 Securities Law].
9 The 1979 Criminal Law was revised by the 8th NPC on March 14, 1997, and
became effective on October 1, 1997 (it was later amended in December 1999, August
2001, December 2001, December 2002, and most recently February 2005). Articles 160,
161, 180, 181, and 182 are concerned with offenses of false disclosure, insider trading
and market manipulation.
10 See China's Security Regulatory Commission, http://www.csrc.gov.cn. Between
January 1994 to November 2003 the CSRC made over 300 administrative penalty
decisions concerning securities frauds committed by listed companies, securities
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criminal offenses are committed, detected, and tried, offenders
found guilty are subject to punishments by criminal courts."
On the other hand, these laws and regulations have not
provided adequate protection for the rights and interests of
investors who suffered economic losses as a result of securities
fraud. 12 This remains a fundamental weakness of the system.
Compared with the comprehensive administrative sanctions for
securities fraud, there are very limited provisions in the 1993
Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading that involve
civil liability and civil compensation when dealing with securities
fraud. 13 Although the 1998 Securities Law strengthened the
regulation of securities market and, as the first securities law in
China, brought the national securities market and the regulation
into a new stage, it failed to strengthen provisions concerning civil
liability and civil compensation. n In the meantime, the number of
listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
dramatically increased from less than twenty in the early 1990s to
851 in 1998. 15 Additionally, the number of market investors
companies, accounting firms, law firms, individual directors, managers, and other senior
persons of these companies. Id.
II According to Li Guoguang, the deputy president of the Supreme People's Court,
forty-six securities fraud cases-including cases involving false statement, insider
trading and market manipulation-were charged and tried by the people's courts
between 1997 and the end of 2001 in accordance with the revised 1997 Criminal Law.
See Li Guoguang, Gaofa Fuyuanzhang Li Guoguang Xishuo Guojia JinrongAnquan de
Sifa Baozhang [Deputy President of the Supreme People's Court Li Guoguang Talks in
Detail about JudicialProtectionfor the State FinancialSafety], NEWS WEEKLY, July 23,
2002, http://www.ccmt.org.cn (Zhongguo Shewai Shangshi Haishi Shenpan Wang)
[China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial Website].
12 The provisions found in these laws and regulations are thin and incomplete
concerning civil liabilities of securities fraud and civil compensation to the investors who
suffered economic losses as a result of securities fraud. See infra notes 13 and 14.
13 Article 77 in the 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading is
the only article that touches on the issue of civil liability and compensation, stating:
"where the provision of this regulation is violated and losses are caused to others, it shall
bear liabilities for civil compensation according to law."
14 Articles 67 to 71, 183, and 184 in the 1998 Securities Law deal with market
manipulation and insider trading, which have no stipulations on related civil liabilities.
Only Article 63 expressly mentions civil liability and compensation of losses caused by
the false recording, misleading statement, and material omission made by issuers and
securities companies.
15 CSRC, Introduction to China's SecuritiesMarket, http://www.csrc.gov.cn.
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expanded from about two million in 1992 to approximately forty
million in 1998. 16 This rapid development was inevitably
accompanied by a rise in the number of securities fraud cases and
victim investors, whose losses were compounded by the
indifference and apathy of courts which refused to hear the
victims' claims. 7 Lawyers, academics, and investors alike lobbied
to the 18SPC, calling for the people's court to accept and hear these
cases.

In response, the first circular of the SPC, issued on September
21, 2001, instructed local people's courts to continue to ignore all
civil compensation claims arising from insider trading, market
manipulation, and other securities frauds. 9 The reason given by
the SPC for not accepting such cases was that "the people's courts
do not have necessary conditions to accept and hear such cases
due to current legislative and judicial limitations.,, 20 The second
circular, issued four months later, partially reversed the position of
the first circular by instructing local intermediate people's courts
to accept and hear cases arising from false statement, but not those
arising from insider trading or market manipulation.2 ' The third
circular, issued on January 9, 2003, expanded on the second
circular, setting out more detailed procedural rules for dealing with
false statement cases. 22 These procedural rules, in conjunction
with the relevant provisions in the 1991 Civil Procedure Law,23 the
16 Id.

17 According to Li Guoguang, deputy president of the SPC, none of the civil claims
brought and filed in the people's courts between 1991 and 2002 as a result of insider
trading, market manipulation and false statement was continued to the stage of
substantial hearing. Li Guoguang, supra note 11.
18 Guo Feng, a Beijing-based lawyer and academic who participated in drafting the
Securities Law in early 1990s, actively took part in the campaign together with others on
behalf of aggrieved investors calling for the people's court to accept and hear civil
compensation claims arising from securities frauds.
See Susan V. Lawrence,
ShareholderLawsuits: Ally of the People, FAR E.ECON. REV., May 9, 2002, at 27.
19See The Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Temporary Refusal of Filings
of Securities-Related Civil Compensation Cases, supra note 1.
20 Id.
21 See The Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of
Civil Tort Dispute Cases Arising From False Statement on the Securities Market, supra
note 1.
22 See Rules of the SPC, supra note 3.
23 Adopted by the 7th NPC on April 9, 1991, effective the same day.
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1998 Securities Law, and other relevant laws and regulations,
finally provided local intermediate people's courts with the
guidelines necessary to address compensation claims arising from
securities-related false statements.
This paper will first explore the elements of a false statement
and liability under the Rules of the SPC. An analysis of the details
of the Rules of SPC from an investor-plaintiff's point of view will
follow, highlighting the procedural steps of the claim and the
restrictions imposed by the Rules of the SPC. This is followed by
an examination of the defendant's liabilities and the manner in
which investors' losses are calculated and compensated-the
central concern of the Rules of the SPC. Finally, this paper
considers the limitations of the Rules of the SPC as they pertain to
investor protection, the future development of China's securities
market, and market regulation.
II. False Statements and the Defendant
The Rules of the SPC begin by defining the widely used
phrase "civil compensation cases arising from false statement on
the securities market" (zhengquan shichang yin xujia chenshu
yinfa de minshi peichang anjian).24 Because the "false statement"
(xujia chenshu) is the central basis that gives rise to a cause of
action for civil compensation, it is essential to understand what
constitutes a "false statement" in China's securities market under
the Rules of the SPC and who can be held liable for involvement
in making such false statement.
A. False Statement
According to Article 17 of the Rules of the SPC, a "false
statement on the securities market" is defined as a false recording
(xujia jizai), misleading statement (wudaoxing chenshu), material
omission (zhongda yilou) or improper disclosure (bu zhengdang
pilou), all of which are made against the true fact of major events
1982 Civil Procedure Law (Trial). 1991 Civil Procedure Law [hereinafter 1991 Civ.
Proc. Law].
24 Article 1 defines the civil compensation case arising from false statement on the
securities market as "the civil compensation case brought to the people's court by the
investors of securities market who have suffered losses as a result of the false statement
made in violation of the law by those who have a duty to disclose information." Rules of
the SPC, supra note 3.

20051

383

CIVIL LITIGATION & CHINA'S SECURITIES MARKET

by those who have a duty to disclose information on the securities
market.25 Article 17 further defines these four types of false
statements: (1) a false recording occurs when those who have a

duty to

information

disclose

present

non-existing

facts

in

disclosure documents; (2) the misleading statement is made by
wrongdoers in disclosure documents or announcement to the
media which influences investors to act, resulting in significant

detriment to their investments; (3) a material omission is the
failure to disclose, either wholly or partially, required information
by one with the duty to have done so; (4)

improper disclosure

occurs when one who has a duty to disclose information, but fails
to do so within an appropriate time frame or in the appropriate
manner prescribed by law.26 According to Article 17 of the Rules
of the SPC, major events (zhongda shijian) should be determined

by referring to relevant provisions of 1998 Securities Law.27
Both the 1998 Securities Law and the 1993 Provisional
Regulations on
types of false

Share Issuing and
statements-namely,

Trading identify three
false recordings (xujia

jizai), misleading statements (wudaoxing chenshu) and
material omissions (zhongda yilou)28-that are identical to the
aforementioned three types of false statement under the Rules
of the SPC. Unlike the Rules of the SPC, the 1998 Securities Law
does not define these three types of false statements. 29 Likewise,
25 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art.17,
26 Id. art. 17,

1.

3-6.

27 Relevant provisions of the 1998 Securities Law include Articles 59, 60, 61, 62,
and 72, which are expressly listed by Article 17 of the Rules of the SPC. Rules of the
SPC, supra note 3, art.17, 2. Article 62 is directly relevant, and states: "when major
events take place which may have a material affect on the trading price of shares of a
listed company and investors are not aware of them, the company shall promptly report
such events to the CSRC and the stock exchange." Id. Article 62 further sets out a list
of the major events including, among others: material change of business, major
investment, important contract, material debt or loss incurred, and change of senior
management staff. Id. Articles 60 and 61 set out basic statutory requirements for
interim and annual reports. Id. Article 59 imposes an obligation to companies to
disclose information in issuing and listing documents truthfully and completely. Id.
Article 72 prohibits relevant individuals and organizations from making false statements
on securities trading market.
28 1998 Securities Law, supra note 8, arts. 24, 59, 63, and 177; 1993 Provisional
Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading, supra note 6, arts. 17, 21, 73, and 74.
29 See 1998 Securities Law, supra 8, arts. 24, 59, 63, and 177.
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the case for the 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and
Trading identify the same three types of false statement, but are
without their respective definitions. 30 Therefore, it is helpful that
the Rules of SPC not only reiterate the position of the 1998
Securities Law and 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing
and Trading but also provide further definitions, albeit brief, for
the three types of false statement. Improper disclosure 3' is not
prescribed by the 1998 Securities Law and 1993 Provisional
Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading.32 It is an offense
unique to the Rules of the SPC, where it is included in the
definition of false statement with the original three elements.33
As a result, the issue is whether improper disclosure alone can
be treated as a "false statement," thus constituting independent
grounds for civil compensation action by investors. In other
words, should the definition of "false statement" be broadly or
narrowly interpreted? There is no clear indication in the Rules of
the SPC that improper disclosure alone can constitute a false
statement giving rise to a civil compensation action by investors.34
What remains to be determined is whether the Rules of the SPC
intend improper disclosure to be an integrated element of the
definition of "false statement" or a separate ground for civil
action. There is no doubt that an essential requirement of the 1998
Securities Law is that disclosures should be timely and made in a
manner prescribed by applicable law and regulations.35 However,
it is beyond the scope of the 1998 Securities Law definition of
false statement 36 when an action is brought to the people's court
30 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading, supra note 6, arts.
17, 21, 73, and 74.

31 In other words, improper disclosure is the delay or outright failure to disclose
required information in a manner not prescribed by law and regulations.
32 The term "improper disclosure" is not found throughout the 1998 Securities Law
and the 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading.
33 Article 61 of the 1998 Securities Law requires listed companies to submit their
annual reports within four months from the end of a financial year, while Article 62
requires listed companies to make a prompt report of major events to the CSRC and the
stock exchange. Article 63 of the 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and
Trading requires listed companies to disclose information to the national newspapers
designated by the CSRC. Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art.17, T 6.
34 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 17.
35 See 1998 Securities Law, supra note 8, arts. 61, 62, 110, and 177.
36 This must be in accordance with Article 17 of the Rules of the SPC.
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claiming false statement based either on a defendant's failure to
disclose required information within an appropriate time limit, or
on a failure to disclose in newspaper designated by CSRC. 37
Looking at both cases dealt with by the CSRC and at cases
brought to the people's court to date, punishable false statements
normally fall into the three categories of false statement listed by
the 1998 Securities Law.38
There are different scholarly views on the definition of "false
statement" under China's securities law, and such views depart on
the nature, manner, and classification of false statements. 39 One
point equally emphasized by scholars is that false statements
should relate to major or material events.4 ° Such events should
include: (1) existing material facts that may affect the price of
securities, (2) material changes to existing facts or situations that
may affect the price of securities, and (3) material information
37 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

38 Consider the case involving Chengdu Hongguang Industrial Shareholding
Company as an example. It is a typical case dealt with by the CSRC. Hongguang
company specialized in the production of electron vacuum devices such as black and
white and color television tubes and glass bulbs. When Hongguang made its public
offering in June 1997, the company issued seventy million A shares that raised 410.2
million yuan. Suspicion was generated by the great disparity between Hongguang's
projected profits in its prospectus and actual profits after its IPO. In October 1998,
the CSRC imposed sanctions upon the company and thirteen directors after an
investigation, which found that at the time of applying for listing, the company
falsely reported its 1996 profits and concealed a major event when it did not disclose
problems relating to a key production line. After the listing, the company defrauded
investors by underreporting the company's losses in its 1997 interim and annual reports
and misusing capital raised from the offering. In the prospectus it was stated that all the
capital raised would be used for expansion of color television tube production line; in
fact, only 16.5% of the capital raised was used for this purpose with the remaining
portion used for paying back bank loans and making up for past losses. The company
never disclosed this as a major event. The CSRC fined Hongguang one million yuan,
confiscated 4.5 million yuan, and permanently banned He Xingyi, chairman of the board
of directors, from serving at the senior management level any listed company or
securities company. See Daniel M. Anderson, Taking Stock in China: Company
Disclosure and Information in China's Stock Markets, 88 GEo L.J. 1919, 1931-33
(2002). For the CSRC's penalty decision, see Chufa Jueding [Penalty Decision]
(promulgated by the CSRC, Oct. 26, 1998), CSRC investigation series number [1998]
75, http://www.csrc.gov.cn.
39 See Huan Xiding & Xu Qinzhong, Shilun Zhengquanfa Zhong de Xujia Chenshu
[On False Statements in the Securities Law], ZHENGFA XUEKAN [4 JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW], at 22-25 (2001).
40 Id. at 22-23.
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composed of material facts and material changes that may affect
the price of securities. 41 Article 17 of the Rules of the SPC
indicates that false statements are related to material events.4 2 The
three-fold significance of this connection is as follows: (1) it
clarifies the position of the 1998 Securities Law, since the false
recording and misleading statements are not clearly prescribed to
the terms of material event; (2) it sets out criteria for plaintiffs and
defendants to argue before the court when debating the existence
of a causal link between false statements and losses; and (3) it
could have a positive effect on the securities market, because
companies and investors would focus on key information and

reduce other unnecessary information on the market, which could
reduce the cost incurred by companies after disclosing
information.43
B. Defendants

Those who make false statements directly or indirectly could
be liable to investors in a civil suit. Article 7 of the Rules of the
SPC, in accordance with relevant provisions of 1998 Securities
Law and 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing
and Trading, 44 provides a specific list of possible defendants.
This list includes a wide range of companies, organizations,
and individuals.45 It is noteworthy that promoters, controlling
41 See, Guo Feng, Xujia Chenshu Qingquan de Rendingji Peichang [Determination
of Tort of False Statement and Compensation], ZHONGGUO FAUXE [2 CHINA LEGAL
SCIENCE], at 96 (2003).
42 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 17, IT I and 2.
43 See Guo Feng, supra note 41, at 97.
44 1998 Securities Law, supra note 8, arts. 24, 63, 72, 161, and 202; Provisional

Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading, supra note 6, art. 17.
45 Article 7 of the Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, states:
The defendants to the civil compensation claims arising from securities-related
false statement should be those who make false statements, including (1)
promoters, controlling shareholders and the like who exercise actual control; (2)
issuers or listed companies; (3) securities underwriters; (4) securities listing
sponsors; (5) professional intermediaries including accountant firms, law firms
and asset valuation firms; (6) responsible directors, supervisors, managers and
other senior management personnel of the issuers, listed companies, securities
underwriters, or securities listing sponsors; directly responsible persons of
professional intermediaries; and (7) other organisations or individual persons
who make false statements.
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shareholders, and those who exercise actual control over the
company are named at the top of the list; this is an important
provision that would have a significant impact in practice. 46 It is
significant that directors, supervisors, managers, and other senior
management personnel employed by issuers, listed companies,
securities underwriters, or securities listing sponsors could become
defendants if they are responsible for making false statements.47
The same duty to refrain from making false statements binds
persons in accounting, law, or asset-evaluation firms. 48 The Rules
of the SPC do not specifically mention the position of those
companies or organizations involving foreign parties, such as joint
same way, in
ventures, but they could become defendants in the
49
accordance with Article 7 of the Rules of the SPC.

Compared to the Second Circular of the SPC-where possible
defendants are not named in a specific list but only mentioned
briefly in the context of courts' jurisdictions over such civil
lawsuits-the current Rules of the SPC are broader in scope and
provide a clearer list of possible defendants. 5 ° Investors may,
according to the Rules of the SPC, sue any one of the possible
defendants on the list as an individual defendant, or sue all of them
46 Jia Wei, a judge of the Supreme People's Court who participated in the drafting
of the Rules of the SPC, thinks that it has a positive and practical significance to
highlight promoters and controlling shareholders on the list as defendants to be sued by
investors. See Jia Wei, Zhengquan Shichang Qinquan Minshi Zeren zhi Faren-Jiexi
'Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi Peichang
Anjian de Ruogan Guiding' [The Commencement of Civil Liabilityfor the Tort on the
Securities Market-Explanation and Analysis of 'Several Provisions of the Supreme
People's Court on Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Arising from False Statements on
the Securities Market'], FAL0 SHIYONG [3 APPLICATION OF LAW], at 9 (2003).
47 Id. at 7.
48 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 7,

5; supra note 45.

49 Beijing KPMG Zhenhua, a joint venture accountant firm, and Hong Kong
KPMG accountant firm became defendants in Jinggang B share case filed to the
Intermediate People's Court of Shenyang City on February 9, 2003, for their
involvement in Jingzhou Gangwu Company's false statement, whose B share was listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May 1998. See Shenyang Zhongyuan Shenli
Jinggang B Gu An, Bimawei Fenzhi Jigou Cheng Beigao [Shenyang Intermediate
People's Court Hear Jinggang B Share Case, KPMG Branch Office Becomes
Defendant], Feb. 11, 2003, http://www.chinacourt.org [hereinafter Shenyang].

50 See The Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of
Civil Tort Dispute Cases Arising From False Statement on the Securities Market, supra
note 1, art. 5.
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as joint defendants. 5 Significantly, Article 7 of the Rules of
the SPC leaves the list open by concluding with the phrase,
"other organizations and individual persons who make false
statements. 52 In other words, whoever makes false statements
should be held liable. This leaves courts with substantial leeway.
Obvious cases include newspapers, television, or other media who
knowingly participate in making false statements to the public.
Difficulty may arise in deciding less obvious cases-for example,
where the role played by organizations or individuals is indirect.
Under such circumstances, it may not be easy for a local
intermediate people's court to draw a clear line for determining
who should be made a defendant without further guidelines from
the SPC. Nevertheless, the Rules of the SPC's provision on
possible defendants, together with the provisions on defendants'
liability, will certainly benefit investors.54 In addition, they could
play a preventative function by sending out a warning signal to
those who are involved in securities-related disclosure of
information one way or another.
III.Procedural Rules
Before investors go to the people's courts to claim
compensation for their losses resulting from false statements, there
must be an administrative penalty decision or a criminal court
55
judgment made against the wrongdoers for their false statements.
On this basis, the people's court is afforded jurisdiction to hear
investor's cases. After this initial procedural step, claimant
investors face a series of issues addressed by the Rules of the SPC,
including the following:
(1) Under what conditions will the people's courts accept their
cases?
(2) Which courts have jurisdiction to hear their claims?
(3) What is the relevant statute of limitations period and how is
it calculated?
51 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 12.
52 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 7,

7; supra note 45.

53 See Sheng Huanwei & Zhu Chuan, infra note 71, at 101-02.
54 See the discussion under "Defendants' Liability and Compensation of Investors'
Losses"; see infra Part IV.

55 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 6.
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(4) What are the forms of action claimant investors can choose
for their lawsuits?
(5) What is the role of mediation in their respective
proceeding?
A. Administrative Penalty Decision and Criminal Court
Judgment
One of the restrictive provisions stipulated in the Second
Circular of the SPC was that the people's court could not accept
civil compensation lawsuits by investors arising from securitiesrelated, false statements.56 The only exception is if the CSRC or
its regional office already investigated the alleged false statements
and imposed an administrative penalty on which investors could
rely as a factual basis for their actions. This restrictive rule has
not been changed under the current Rules of the SPC, except that
criminal judgments by the people's courts and administrative
penalty decisions made by authorities other than the CSRC or its
regional offices are now recognized. 58 Therefore, the people's
court may hear such civil compensation actions in addition to the
administrative penalty decision made by the CSRC or its regional
offices.59
In accordance with the Rules of the SPC, investors can go to
the people's court if the alleged false statement has been
investigated by one of these authorities and a sanction has been

56 The Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of Civil
Tort Dispute Cases Arising From False Statement on the Securities Market, supra note 1,
art. 2.
57 Id.

58 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 5. Administrative penalty decisions made by
authorities other than the CSRC and its regional offices include the decision made by the
Ministry of Finance as well as decisions made by other authorities and institutions that
have power to impose administrative penalties. In accordance with Articles 16, 17, and
18 of the Administrative Penalty Law, whether an organization has power to impose
administrative penalty, except those which limit personal freedom, is primarily a matter
decided by the State Council, provincial or autonomous region governments. Further,
the organization has to be one with a function to administer public affairs. Law of the
People's Republic of China on Administrative Penalty (promulgated by the 8th Nat'l
People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996), translated at LexisNexis
PRCLEG 1148 (2005) [hereinafter Admin. Penalty Law].
59 Id.
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imposed. 60 This rule has both procedural and evidentiary effects.
Procedurally, investors may commence litigation if there is an
administrative or criminal sanction, regardless of the content of
sanction documents. 61 Evidentially, the effect is that the facts
concluded in the sanction documents are treated as evidence in
civil litigation.62 It has no conclusive effect with regard to the
scope of defendants not named in sanction documents, and
plaintiffs can decide who to sue as defendant in addition to the
named defendants. In other words, administrative or criminal
sanctions are treated only as a basis for the court to accept cases,
not as a basis for determining defendants in the civil suit. This is
regarded as beneficial to investors by allowing them to choose
who to sue and who not to sue. Therefore, the investor may
enlarge or limit the number of defendants beyond the sanction
document.63
Although it is a positive step that the Rules of the SPC have
expanded the reach of authorities whose penalty decisions are
recognized as a prerequisite for acceptance of civil actions by the
people's courts, this prerequisite rule-together with its original
format stipulated in the second circular of the SPC-has
nevertheless suffered a great deal of criticism. The main criticism
is that allowing angry shareholders to flood the people's court may
have adverse social and political repercussions.64 Others criticize
60 The majority of cases filed in the people's court so far are based upon the
penalty decisions of the CSRC and its regional offices or criminal court judgments.
Jinggang B share case which was filed to the Intermediate People's Court of Shenyang
City on February 9, 2003, is the first case based upon a penalty decision made by the
Ministry of Finance in September 2002 against Jingzhou Gangwu Company for the false
statement it made in connection with the listing of its B share in 1998. For the news
report of the case, see Shenyang, supra note 49.
61 See Song Yixing, Xujia Chenshu Minshi Peichang Susong Zhidu Ruogan Wenti
de Sikao [Thoughts on Several Issues of the Litigation System for Civil Compensation
Arising from False Statements], FALO SHIYONG [4 APPLICATION OF LAW], at 9 (2003)

(discussing more on the procedural and evidential effects of the rule).
62 See id.
63 Id.

64 See Lawrence, supra note 18, at 27 (stating that "so for many officials, angry
shareholders organizing themselves into nationwide networks for the purpose of lawsuits
spells trouble"). See also William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent
Conflict Between China's Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27
BROOK. J. INT'L LAW 515 (2001-2002) (describing "stock fever" in China and citizens on

several occasions have taken to the streets and rioted against police for the mere
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the rule from a legal and procedural point of view. In their view

this restrictive rule actually reduces the civil litigation process
based on the availability of administrative decisions or criminal
court judgments.65 Further, critics assert that the expanded rules
deprive investors of the right to bring a civil claim supplementary
to a criminal proceeding in accordance with the 1996 Criminal
Procedure Law. 66 In both critiques, the SPC is chastised for
exceeding its judicial interpretation power.

One of the possible consequences of this rule is that it
encourages makers of false statements to use either social
connections or bribery to influence the administrative investigation
in order to escape civil litigation and civil compensation.67 It is true

that administrative processes in China 68 are not as transparent as
court proceedings where cases are tried openly. It is therefore
possible that an administrative investigation process may be
influenced behind-the-scenes by personal connections, local
protections, or political forces. For example, it has been noted that
the timing of the investigation and the inability of the CSRC to
pursue five directors involved in the case of Hainan Minyuan
Modem Agricultural Company was suspect for political reasons,
as well as personal connections.69 The process can even be
opportunity to engage in securities market).
65 However, this has no statutory basis in the 1991 Civil Procedure Law and
effectively limits and thereby deprives of investors' civil litigation rights. See Guiping
Lu, Private Enforcement of Securities FraudLaw in China: A Critique of the Supreme
People's Court 2003 Provisions Concerning Private Securities Litigation, PACIFIC RIM
LAW AND POLICY JOURNAL, 781, 795-98 (2003); see also Yin Jie, Zhengquan Xujia
Chenshu Minshi Zheren Zhidu Lun [On the System of Civil Liability of Securities-related
False Statements], FAUXE [6 LEGAL SCIENCE ], at 110-11 (2003).
66 See Tu Binhua, Zhengquan Xujia Chenshu Minshi Peichang Zheren Jizhi Lun
[On the Mechanism for Civil Compensation Liabilities for Securities-Related False
Statements], FAUXE [6 LEGAL SCIENCE], at 96 (2003).
67 See, e.g., Yin Jie, supra note 65, at 111.
68 This is where a case is investigated by an administrative authority and an

administrative penalty decision is subsequently made.
69 Two of the largest shareholders of Hainan Minyuan Modem Agricultural

Company apparently had ties to China's senior leader at that time. Hainan Minyuan
Modem Agricultural Company made its public offering on April 30, 1993. The
company's 1995 yearly report indicated a profit of 0.001 yuan per share and a stock price
around 3.65 yuan. In January 1997, the company announced a profit in 1996 of 0.867
yuan per share, an improvement of 1290.68 times over profits in 1995. Minyuan's price
rose to 26.18 yuan.

The company released a mysterious "supplemental report" on
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hijacked by wrongdoers or their accomplices without being
noticed by the public and grieved investors.7 ° The abuse of the
administrative investigation process could be prevented if the civil
court plays an active and decisive role in deciding whether a given
statement or an activity amounts to false statement, and whether it
is subject to civil compensation. This could only happen if the
prerequisite rule is lifted by an amendment of the Rules of the
SPC.
On the other hand, some authors-particularly judgessupport the prerequisite procedure set out by the Rules of the
SPC. 7' They argue that the procedure is necessary for the time
being for three reasons. First, it is in line with the current limited
judicial sources of the people's court; it is otherwise difficult for
the people's court to cope with a situation of a "securities
litigation time bomb."72 Second, it can help plaintiffs collect
evidence and reduce their burden of proof; therefore, it is good for
the protection of investors.73 Third, it is in line with the current
provision of the 1998 Securities Law with regard to the power of
the administrative regulator and the role of administrative
February 1, 1997, which changed some of the company's financial indicators. Towards
the end of February 1997, trading of the company's stock was suspended and in March
1997, five directors who approved the false reports resigned and disappeared.
Responding to requests from investors, an investigation into Minyuan's financial reports
was launched on March 5, 1997. After a year-long investigation, the CSRC found that
the company had fraudulently inflated accounts by 1.2 billion yuan from illegal real
estate transactions in Beijing. Minyuan audaciously refused to help the CSRC find the
five directors, and the CSRC later released a notice stating that it was searching for the
five directors but that Minyuan was under "no obligation" to help. See more details in
Daniel M. Anderson, Taking Stock in China: Company Disclosure and Information in
China's Stock Markets, 88 GEo L.J. 1919, 1934-35 (2002).
70 In the case of Hainan Minyuan Modem Agricultural Company, a question was
asked whether the five fugitive directors had behind-the-scenes protectors that were able
to stop the CSRC from compelling Minyuan's help in the investigation. Id. at 1935.
71 See Kong Lin & Ye Jun, Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de
Minshi Peichang Anjian de Shouli Tiaojian [Conditions for Acceptance of Civil
Compensation Cases Arising from False Statements on the Securities Market], FALO
SHIYONG [4 APPLICATION OF LAW], at 21, 22 (2003) (one of the authors is from the

Supreme People's Court). Sheng Huanwei & Zhu Chuan, Zhengquan Xujia Chenshu
Minshi Peichang Yinguo Guanxi Lun [On Causal Link of Civil Compensation Cases
Arising from Securities-related False Statements], FAUXE [6 LEGAL SCIENCE], at 102
(2003) (both authors are from the primary Intermediate People's Court of Shanghai).
72 Kong Lin & Ye Jun, supra note 71, at 21.
73 Id.
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penalty. 14
The 1998 Securities Law gives administrative
regulators a strong overall power to monitor the securities market
and the administrative penalty occupies a central place for the
regulation of China's securities market. Consequently, proponents
argue that it is appropriate to rely upon the role of the
administrative regulator and administrative penalty before making
use of judicial process and the exclusive role played by civil
litigation in compensating victims. "5 While arguing for the
prerequisite procedure, these authors also acknowledge that there
is a defect in the system 76-specifically, when an alleged false
statement is not punished by an administrative regulator or
criminal court for one reason or another, those investors who
suffered losses as a result of the false statement will not be able to
get remedies through civil compensation litigation.7 7
B. Acceptance of Case by the Court
In accordance with Article 6 of the Rules of the SPC, the
people's court should accept a suit by investors if it is brought
under two presumptions: (1) if the losses suffered by investors
themselves result from a false statement on the securities market,
and (2) if the case complies with the four provisions for the
initiation of a civil lawsuit set out in Article 108 of the 1991 Civil
Procedure Law.78 At the heart of Article 6 of the Rules of the SPC
is the requirement that investors must have suffered losses as a
result of false statements and the victims must be the investors

74 Id.
75

Id.

76

Id. at 22.

77

Id.

78 See Civ. Proc. Law, supra note 23, art. 108. These four conditions include: (1)
plaintiffs are those individuals, legal persons, or other organizations whose interests are
directly related to the lawsuits; (2) there are specific defendants; (3) there are specific
claims, facts, and reasons; (4) it is within the scope of civil litigation matters the people's
court accept and within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. In accordance with the
Opinion on Questions Concerning Application of the Civil Procedure Law (Supreme

People's Court, issued on July 14, 1992), arts. 139, 141, and 142 (P.R.C.), if the case

does not comply with these four conditions, the people's court shall make a ruling not to
accept the case, or, where applicable, transfer the case to the court that has jurisdiction.
If the claimant applies again and the application complies with these conditions, the
people's court shall accept the case. Id.
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themselves. 79 Apart from a copy of any relevant administrative
penalty decisions or criminal court judgments, claimants are
required to submit certified documents proving their identities, as
well as any evidence of their investment loss, such as trading
receipts. 80 There must be an effective administrative penalty
decision or a criminal court judgment on point at the time when
the civil litigation is brought to the people's court.8
"Investor" is defined as a natural person, legal person, or other
organization that subscribes and trades securities on the securities
market.82 The "securities market" is defined as: (1) a market
where shares are issued to the public; (2) a trading market where
securities are traded openly; (3) a transferring market where
securities are transferred by securities companies acting as agents;
and (4) other securities markets established with the approval of
the government. 8 3 If investors enter into transactions in these
markets and suffer losses as a result of false statements, they can
79 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 6.
80 Id.
The purpose of the requirement for submission of certified documents
showing the identity of claimants is said to make sure that plaintiffs are those genuine
investors who suffered losses as a result of false statement. But see Tu Binhua, supra
note 66, at 96 (arguing that such a requirement is an unnecessary burden for investors
since their identities have already shown on original documents of accounts or settlement
of securities).
81 For example, in the Jiuzhou case the claimant was rejected by the people's court

because the administrative penalty decision in question had not become effective. The
Jiuzhou group, a listed company from Fujian province, and its thirteen responsible staff
were sanctioned by the CSRC on October 26, 2001, for the false statements it made
concerning the company's profits in 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively. Mr. Cao, a
shareholder of the company who suffered a loss of 104 thousand yuan, filed a case in the
people's court. In examining whether his application satisfies the requirement that there
must an effective administrative penalty decision, the court found that three directors of
the company had never received the administrative penalty decisions from the CSRC and
the CSRC and, when questioned, could not provide evidence to prove the delivery of the
decision to the directors. In accordance with the Admin. Penalty Law, supra note 58,
arts. 40-41, and The Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Relevant Issues of Filing
of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Arising From False Statement on the Securities Market,
supra note 1, art. 2, the court ruled that since the decision was not delivered to all the
parties concerned, it did not become effective. Mr. Cao's application was therefore
turned down by the court. See Yang Limao and Chen Chaoyang, Zhengquan Qinquan
Susong Qianzhi Chengxu de Tantao [Discussion on Prerequisite Procedure in Securities
Tort Litigation], http://www.chinacourt.org [ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG], Nov. 25, 2002.
82 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 2.
83 Id.
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sue the makers of false statements for compensation under the
Rules of the SPC.8 4 Beyond this, the Rules of the SPC are not
applicable. Two kinds of transactions are explicitly excluded from
the application of the Rules of the SPC: (1) transactions illegally
concluded outside the securities market established by the
government, and (2) transactions concluded on the securities
market established by the government but through an agreement of
assignment-a transaction directly negotiated between the
parties."
C. Statute of Limitation and Suspension of Proceeding
The Rules of the SPC stipulate that the limitation period for
such civil suits is two years from the date when an administrative
penalty decision is announced, or when a criminal court judgment
becomes effective. 86 The two-year period is standard for most
civil actions.87 If there are more than two administrative decisions
concerning the same false statement but different false statement
makers, the period is calculated from both the date when the first
administrative decision is announced and-if there is both an
administrative penalty decision and a criminal court judgmentfrom the date when the criminal court judgment becomes
effective, if this comes before the administrative penalty
decision. 88 Since the calculation is based on administrative
penalty decisions or criminal court judgments, it is crucial that the
decision or judgment in question is final. The situation may
become complicated if an administrative penalty decision is
subject to an administrative review or administrative litigation or

84 Id. arts. 1-2.
85 Id. art. 3.
86 Id. art. 5.

87 General Principles of the Civil Law, (promulgated by Order no. 37 of the
President, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 135, translated at LexisNexis
PRCLEG 1165, 2005 (P.R.C.); see also General Principles of the Civil Law, arts. 137

and 140 [hereinafter Gen. Principles of Civ. Law]. This further provides that under
special circumstances the people's court may extend the limitation period; the limitation
period shall be discontinued if a suit is brought or if one party makes a claim for or
agrees to fulfillment of obligations and a new limitation period shall be counted from the
time of the discontinuance. The two-year period generally starts on the day when the
plaintiff knows or ought to have known that his or her rights have been infringed. Id.
88 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 5.
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if the criminal court judgment is subject to a supervision procedure
set out in Articles 203 to 207 of the 1996 Criminal Procedure
Law.8 9
With regard to administrative penalties, Article 11 of the Rules
of the SPC provides that after the civil court begins to hear a case
it may suspend the hearing if the defendant applies for an
administrative review or initiates administrative litigation against
the administrative penalty he received and, if the penalty in
question is cancelled the court should end the hearing. 90 However,
Article 11 does not provide further guidance as to who will bear
the cost of a cancelled proceeding if the hearing comes to an end
because the administrative penalty in question is cancelled. 91
The Rules of the SPC provide no further procedural guidance
regarding criminal judgments. If a defendant appeals against the
criminal judgment in accordance with the supervision procedure of
Articles 203-207, this gives rise to several questions. Assuming a
civil court starts to hear a case and the defendant appeals against
the criminal judgment, should the civil court suspend the hearing
in the same way as it suspends the cases involving administrative
penalty decisions? Or should the court continue to hear the case
until the judgment is overturned by the criminal appeal court,
which giving civil court a reason to end the hearing? Under such
circumstances, who is going to bear the cost of failed civil
proceeding? The defendant or his representative can appeal at any
time against an effective and final judgment if there exists one of
the circumstances prescribed by Article 204 of the 1996 Criminal
Procedure Law (i.e., as if new evidence emerges with an error in

89 According to the 1999 Administrative Review Law (promulgated by Standing
Comm. of the People's Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 9 (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter 1999 Admin. Rev. Law], a defendant can apply for an administrative review
of the penalty decision made by the CSRC or other administrative authorities within
sixty days from the date of the receipt of the decision. Alternatively, he can, in
accordance with art. 39 of the 1989 Administrative Procedure Law, directly apply within
three months to the people's court for an administrative litigation unless it is required by
administrative regulation that he has to go through the administrative review process
first. 1989 Administrative Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat.'l
People's Cong., Apr. 1, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 39, translated at LexisNexis
PRCLEG 1204 (2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1989 Admin. Proc. Law].
90 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 11.
91 Id.
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judgment regarding the fact of the case). 92 It is therefore necessary
for the Rules of the SPC to provide further guidance regarding the
situation that arises when a criminal court judgment is subject to a
supervision procedure.
D. Jurisdictionof the Court
Intermediate people's courts are the courts designated by the
Rules of the SPC as courts of first instance to hear such lawsuits. 93
They include the intermediate people's courts that are located: (1)
in the cities where provincial governments or autonomous region
governments are located; 94 (2) in the four metropolitan cities; 9
(3) in the cities that have a separate planning arrangement; 96 and
(4) in the cities of special economic zones. 97 The second level
intermediate people's courts, in accordance with the 1991 Civil
Procedure Law, have jurisdiction as first instance courts over three
categories of civil cases: (1) cases involving foreign parties;
(2) the cases that are significant to local jurisdictions; and (3) the
cases that are designated by the SPC. 9' Cases arising from
securities-related false statements are complicated and of wide
significance, so it is anticipated that the SPC would, in accordance
with the provisions of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law, designate
intermediate people's courts as the primary court to deal with
these cases. 99 This arrangement is criticized because it "may
prevent defrauded investors from getting timely judicial remedies

92 Other circumstances prescribed by Article 204 of the 1996 Criminal Procedure
Law include where the law is found to have been wrongly applied and where the judge
who tried the case is found to have accepted bribery.
93 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 8.
94 There are twenty-seven cities where provincial governments and autonomous
regional governments are located, such as Guangzhou in Guangdong province and Lasha
in the Tibet autonomous region.
95 These four metropolitan cities are Beijing, Tianjing, Shanghai, and Chongqing.
96 These are the cities that are separated from other cities in terms of budgetary
arrangement, investment priority, appointment of administration, etc. They are often
those few big and important cities of a province or autonomous region apart from their
capital cities.
97 They are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong province and Xiamen in
Fujian province.
98 1991 Civ. Proc. Law, supra note 23, art. 19.

99 See Rules of the SPC, supra note 3.
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due to the limited number of intermediate level courts and the
potentially large number of suits."' 00
Regarding jurisdiction of the court, the Rules of the SPC
distinguish between issuer or listed company defendants and other
defendants.'1 ' Where the defendants are issuers or listed company
defendants, the intermediate people's court at the location of
issuers or listed companies shall have jurisdiction over the case,
as designated by the Rules of the SPC.' °2 Where the defendants
are an organization, individuals other than issuers, or listed
companies, the intermediate people's court located at the residence
of the defendants shall have jurisdiction over the case, in
accordance with the Rules of SPC. 103 The basic principle
regarding the so-called geographical jurisdiction (diyu guanxia) is
prescribed by Article 22 of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law.04
Article 22 provides that the people's court that is located at the
residence or domicile of defendants, whether an individual or legal
person, is the court that has jurisdiction over the civil action at
issue. 15 Where there are several defendants in an action with
residences in multiple jurisdictions, the people's courts in these
different jurisdictions shall all have jurisdiction over the action. 106
According to Article 35 of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law, the
plaintiffs can start the action at any one of these courts. 01 7 If the
plaintiffs commence the action at more than one of these courts,
the court that first accepts the case shall have the jurisdiction over
the action.' 08
According to the Rules of the SPC, where the defendants are
not issuers or listed companies, the intermediate people's court
that has jurisdiction and has accepted the case may, upon
application by the parties involved or consent by all the plaintiffs,
add relevant issuers or listed companies as defendants to the
100 Guiping Lu, supra note 65, at 794.
101 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 9.
102 Id.
103

Id.

104 1991 Civ. Proc. Law, supra note 23, art. 22.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.art. 35.
108 Id.
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case. 109 However, that court must transfer the case to the
intermediate people's court located at the residence of the issuer or
listed company defendants."' On the other hand, if no application
has been put forward by the parties, no consent has been obtained
from the plaintiffs, and if the court regards it as necessary to add
relevant issuers or listed companies as defendants, the court may
then notify the issuer or listed company to join the litigation as
defendants, though the court may not transfer the case
thereafter. "'
The problem with the distinction made by the Rules of the
SPC between issuer and listed company defendants and other
defendants and the priority given to the intermediate people's
courts situated at the location of issuers or listed companies is that
it may leave plaintiff shareholders and other defendants in a
disadvantageous position. This is because the local intermediate
people's courts in proximity to an issuer or listed company have a
tendency to make rulings or judgments in favor of these large
issuers or listed companies and against small and distant plaintiff
shareholders.112 To protect themselves, the plaintiff shareholders
may, in accordance with Article 10 of the Rules of the SPC, refuse
to give consent to the court to add a relevant issuer or a listed
company as an additional defendant; therefore, the court may not
transfer the case to the local court of issuers or listed companies.
Note that the court can freely add issuers or listed companies as
defendants if the court deems it necessary. 113 In effect, this
provision gives plaintiff shareholders a limited degree of
procedural protection. The same is true for the defendants who
prefer to have their case heard at their residence rather than to be
transferred to the local court of the issuer or listed company
defendants.

109 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 10.
110 Id.
I1I Id.

112 See Walter Hutchens, infra note 134, at 640 (arguing that the Rules of the SPC
require that suits be brought in the defendant's home jurisdiction, where the connections
among local courts, local listed companies, and local governments suggest that plaintiff
cannot easily prevail).
113 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 10.
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E. Forms of Action Available to Investors
The second circular of the SPC ruled out class action suits
(jituan susong) as an acceptable form of action for civil
compensation cases arising from securities-related false
statements. "4 This continues to be the position in the current
1
Rules of the SPC."'
The form of action available for plaintiffs to
bring compensation claims to the court is instead limited to
individual action (dandu susong) or joint action (gongtong
susong)." 6 In accordance with the 1991 Civil Procedure Law,
joint action refers to an action where one or both parties consist of
two or more persons with an object of action being the same or of
the same category." 7 The people's court considers that, with the
consent of the parties, the action can be combined into one trial."18
Since joint actions, particularly those with a large number of
parties on either side, have representatives to manage the case on
behalf of other participants, they are also commonly called a
representative action (daibiaoren susong)."9 As the number of
claimants involved in a securities-related false statement case
tends to be large, it follows that the joint action should be a
dominant form of action for this type of case.
This is reflected in the Rules of the SPC, which contain further
detailed rules regarding joint action and when priority is given to
joint rather than individual action. 2 ° Thus, when there are both
The Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of Civil
Tort Dispute Cases Arising From False Statement on the Securities Market], supra note
1, art. 4.
115 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 12.
114

116 Id.

The same category (tongyi zhonglei) means the rights and obligations in an
action fall into a same type. For example, three different and unconnected defendants
owe a plaintiff rent of various amounts. The rent and obligation to pay it fall into same
category. Instead of dealing with these three suits individually, the court may combine
them into one joint action. See Liu JIAXING, M1NSM SUSONG JIAOCHENG [TEXTBOOK ON
CIVIL LITIGATION] 85 (1982), Beijing Daxue Chubanshe [Beijing University Press].
118 1991 Civ. Proc. Law, supra note 23, art. 53.
1l7

119 See Tu Binhua, supra note 66, at 97; see also Note, infra note 129, at 1523 n.2
(noting "although formally called daibiaoren susong (representative lawsuits), many
Chinese commentators and press accounts use the terms jituan susong or jituanxing
susong (class action), especially when referring to suits in which the number of plaintiffs
is not fixed.").
120 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, arts. 13, 14, 15, and 16.
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individual and joint actions initiated by different plaintiffs suing
the same defendants based on the same false statement they made,
the court may order the individual action plaintiff to join the joint
action. 2 ' Similarly, when more than one joint action involves the
same defendants based on the same false statement, the court may
consolidate the claims into one joint action. 122 The number of
plaintiffs in a joint action should be determined before the hearing,
and where the number of plaintiffs is large, two to five
representatives may be elected as litigation representatives. 123 These
litigation representatives, through a special power of attorney
granted to them by the other plaintiffs, represent the plaintiffs in
court, change or cancel claims made by the plaintiffs, and settle or
reach a mediation agreement with defendants. 124 Each of the
litigation representatives may entrust one or two legal representatives
with the action. 125 Where the case involves a large number of
plaintiffs, the court may assign a total amount of compensation in
the judgment itself, with an attached appendix that lists the names
of every plaintiff and the compensation awarded to each of
them. 26 The Rules of the SPC came into effect on February 1,
2003, and the first joint action case involving several hundred
plaintiffs was accepted in that month by the Intermediate People's
Court of Ha'erbin City.1 27 This has since been followed
by more
28
joint action cases coming into the people's court.
121 Id. art. 13.
122 Id.
123 Id. art. 14.
124 Id. art. 15.
125 Id. art. 14.

126 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 16.
127 See Ma Shiling, Gongtong Susong Diyi An Jian, Daqing Lianyi An Suopei Yu
Qianwan [The FirstJoint Action Case Was Filed,Daqing Lian Case Compensation Over
Ten Million yuan], Zhongguo Fayuan Wang, Feb. 11, 2003, http://www.chinacourt.org.
On February 9, 2003, the Intermediate People's Court of Ha'erbin City formally
accepted a case represented by the Guohao Law Firm's Shanghai office involving an
initial group of 107 plaintiffs and another 300 or more plaintiffs to be added to the case
by the middle of that month. In March 2002, the Guohao Law Firm's Shanghai and
Beijing offices were entrusted respectively by five representatives on behalf of 679
investors to sue Daqing Lianyi, a listed company, for the losses caused by the false
statement it made. However, the case was not accepted by the court until after the Rules
of the SPC became effective. Id.
128 See Jinan Gumin Zhuanggao Dongfang Dianzi, Suopei Jin E Da 300 Yu
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Articles 54 and 55 of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law separate
joint actions"' into two categories: (1) cases in which the number
of parties is fixed, and (2) cases in which the number of parties is
not known at the time the case is filed. 30 Since Article 55 allows
the court's rulings or judgments to be applied to those who have
not registered with the court at the time the case is filed but who
later bring lawsuits within the prescribed statutory limitation
period, a joint action under Article 55 may accommodate a
potentially large number of plaintiffs, compared with the joint
action under Article 54, in which definite parties are determined

Wanyuan [Jinan Shareholders Sue Dongfang Dianzi, Claiming Figure Reaches Over 3
Million Yuan], July 10, 2003, http://www.chinacourt.org [ZHONGGUO FAYUAN
WANG]; Yinchuanshi Zhongyuan Zhengshi Shouli Yinguangxia Minshi Qinquan
Peichang An [Yinchuan City Intermediate People's Court Formally Accepted
Yinguangxia Civil Tort Compensation Case], Aug. 1, 2002, http://www.chinacourt.org
[ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG]. The Dongfang Dianzi case was filed to the
Intermediate People's Court of Qingdao City in July 2003, which involved an initial
group of 141 shareholder plaintiffs with more to join. After four individual cases suing
Guangxia (Yinchuan) Industrial Limited Company were accepted by the Intermediate
People's Court of Yinchuan City on July 31, 2003, the lawyers representing the case
prepared more documents involving about 1,000 plaintiffs. Id.
129 See, e.g., Note, Class Action Litigation in China, I 11 HARv. L. REV. 1523-41
(1998) (describing as "class actions" instead of joint actions) [hereinafter Note].
130 See 1991 Civ. Proc. Law, supra note 23. Article 54 impacts cases in which the
number of parties is fixed at the time the case is filed. It provides that if the number of
parties on either side of the litigation is large, such parties may choose representatives to
carry out the litigation. Article 55 also impacts cases in which the number of parties is
not fixed at the time the case is filed. It provides that if many parties have similar claims
but the actual number of parties is not known at the time the case is filed, the court may
issue a notice detailing the case and the claims and notifying all persons whose rights are
similarly affected to register with the court within a specified period. The parties who
have registered may select representative. If the parties fail to do so, the people's court
may choose representatives in consultation with the registered parties. Article 55 also
provides that the court's ruling or judgment is binding on all those who have registered
with the court, and is applicable to those who have not registered with the court but who
have brought lawsuits within the prescribed limitation period. Both Articles 54 and 55
provide that the acts of the representatives are binding on the parties whom they
represent. However, if the representatives change or abandon claims, accept the claims
of the opposing party, or settle the case, they must seek the consent of the parties whom
they represent. According to Articles 59 and 62 of the Supreme People's Court Opinions
on "Several Issues Relating to Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC,"
"large" parties are generally meant to be more than ten parties and, two to five
representatives may be elected and they may entrust one or two persons as their legal
representatives. Id.
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and filed to the court before the case is heard. 131 Because Article
14 of the Rules of the SPC requires that the number of plaintiffs in
a joint action be determined before the hearing, it effectively limits
such litigation to the first category of joint action prescribed by
Article 54 of 1991 Civil Procedure Law. 132 One of the negative
consequences of this limitation from a point of view of investor
claimants is that they have to bear a burden to make sure that they
join the action before the hearing; otherwise, they may not be
compensated or could incur unnecessary costs if they later bring
individual actions. Some criticize this limitation as a substantial
procedural hurdle to investors' access to judicial recourse because
it could lead
to judicial inefficiency and injustice to small
33
investors.1
The joint action permitted under the Rules of the SPC
resembles a U.S. class action in some respects, though it differs in
regards to the registration requirement, the right of plaintiffs, the
power of representatives, and the binding effect of the court's
rulings or judgments.'34 Some Chinese scholars advocate that the
U.S.-style class action is more economical and better for this type
of litigation and the SPC should adapt it for such litigation, subject
to further amendments to the 1991 Civil Procedure Law. 135
Others, particularly judges from the people's courts, argue that
conditions are not ripe for such a move.'3 6 They posit that since
131 Id.
132 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 14.
133 See Guiping Lu, supra note 65, at 798-801.

134 See Tu Binhua, supra note 66, at 97. The author explains the difference between
a class action and a Chinese representative action in three respects: (1) registration; (2)
the power of representatives; and (3) the application of the court's rulings or judgments.
See generally Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material
Disclosure about China's Legal System? 24 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 599, 641 (2003).

See also Note, supra note 129, at 1525 (stating that "in the case of class actions, China
appears to have drawn heavily on the American experience").
135 See Hutchens, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. at 643; Lawrence, supra note 18, at
27; Tu Binhua, supra note 66, at 97.
136 See Jia Wei, supra note 46, at 8; Xi Xiaoming & Jia Wei, Guanyu Shenli
Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan
Guiding de Lijie yu Shiyong [Understandingand Application of 'Several Provisionsof
the Supreme People's Court on Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Arising from False
Statements on the Securities Market'] RENMIN SIFA [2 PEOPLE'S JUDICIARY] 11 (2003)
(P.R.C.).
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China at present has no organization similar to the intermediaries
in the United States who register thousands of investors and
calculate their losses, it is unrealistic to rely upon only the
people's courts to make announcements, register plaintiffs, and
undertake work in relation to application of judgments.'37 It is
therefore necessary to draw a distinction between a joint action
with fixed plaintiffs and a joint action with a large number of
indefinite plaintiffs, which is in line with the current conditions of
the people's court and the securities market. 31 8 To a certain extent,
their arguments explain the reason why the Rules of the SPC have
adopted the joint action with a fixed number of plaintiffs as the
most suitable form of action for this type of litigations.'39
Critics view the failure to adapt the U.S.-style class action in
China for private securities litigation as economic and political in
nature: large class actions could expose state-owned listed
companies to massive private securities litigation judgments as
well as cause political unrest, because the large concentration of
aggrieved shareholders into an organized group has the potential
to trigger anxiety and sharpen conflict between dispersed
individual investors and the state.14 ° A study of the development
of class actions in China both before and after the enactment of the
1991 Civil Procedure Law-including suits in the area of lowquality products, consumer fraud, environmental pollution,
economic contracts, local government actions, and securities law
violations-evince the increasing prevalence of class actions as
one aspect of the explosion in civil litigation over the past
decade."'4 This increase in class action civil litigation provides an
insight into fundamental tensions in the Chinese legal system:
such tensions exist between the government policy of increasing
the importance of the courts, in part to force local officials to obey
the law, and the legal system's responsiveness to plaintiffs.
Tension also exists between government's desire to harness a

137 Id.
138 Id.

139 Id. Jia Wei, author of the articles, is a judge of the Supreme People's Court and
participated in the drafting of the Rules of SPC. Supra note 46.
140 See Hutchens, supra note 134, at 644-45; see also Lawrence, supra note 18, at
27.
141 See Note, supra note 129, at 1523.
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market-driven legal profession to further implementation of the
law and its desire to continue to tightly regulate lawyers.
Additionally, there is tension between government efforts to shape
the legal system and the plurality of factors that contribute to the
evolution of that system. 142 The fact that only a limited form of
joint action is allowed by the Rules of the SPC as a platform for
the civil litigation arising from securities-related false statements
reflects yet another tension between an urgent need to
accommodate efficiently a large number of such cases and the
people's courts economic and political limitations.
F. The Role of JudicialMediation and Settlement by the
Party
The Rules of the SPC instruct the people's courts to stress
(zhaozhong) mediation while adjudicating cases, and to encourage
parties to settle their disputes.'4 3 The principles and procedures

describing how the people's courts should conduct mediation in
civil proceedings are set out in the 1991 Civil Procedure Law,
which emphasizes the consent (ziyuan) of the party concerned.'
It is required that the people's court engage in mediation on a
voluntary basis and distinguish right from wrong based on clear
facts. 45 Mediation can be conducted by the court before trial or at

any stage prior to judgment, 146 but if it does not result in an
agreement or if one party withdraws before the delivery of the
written mediated agreement, the court should adjudicate
promptly. 47 A mediated agreement becomes legally binding once
it has been delivered to and signed by the parties. 148 However, if
one party can prove that a legally effective mediated agreement
was entered into in violation of the principle of voluntariness or its
142 Id. at 1523-41.
143 See Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 4.

144 See 1991 Civ. Proc. Law, supra note 23, arts. 85-91. Apart from Chapter Eight,
there are few relevant articles concerning mediation in other chapters of the 1991 Civil
Procedure Law.
145 Id. art. 85. Consequently, a mediated agreement must be produced based on the
willingness of both parties and should not violate the law. Id. art. 88.
146 Id. art. 128.
147 Id. art. 91.
148 Id. art. 89.
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content has violated the law, the same case can be retried. "'
150
Although the Rules of the SPC do not reiterate these provisions,
there is no doubt that these are the procedures that must be
adhered to when the people's courts conduct mediations in cases
involving securities-related false statements.
Judicial mediation could play an important role in handling the
large number of securities-related false statement cases. The
people's courts have limited resources, and judicial mediations
could help ensure timely and efficient proceedings. Needless to
say, judicial mediation should be conducted fairly and lawfully in
accordance with the procedure set out in the 1991 Civil Procedure
Law. Most importantly, it must be conducted on a voluntary basis.
It is reported that Chengdu Intermediate People's Court
successfully mediated S.T. Hongguang case, the first securitiesrelated false statement civil case mediated by the people's court."'
Before the enactment of 1991 Civil Procedure Law, which
replaced the 1982 Civil Procedure Law (Trial), coercion and
unlawfulness were the most noteworthy problems associated with
judicial mediation. 152 Although the 1991 Civil Procedure Law
emphasizes the principle of voluntary submission to mediation and
compliance with the law in mediating cases, there is still
widespread abuse of the judicial mediation system."5 3 The stress

149 See 1991 Civ. Proc. Law, supra note 23, at 180.

150 There is only one brief article in the Rules of the SPC which deals with the issue
of judicial mediation. See Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 4.
151 A court mediation agreement was reached between eleven plaintiffs and two
defendants, with ninety percent of the plaintiff claims compensated. See ST Hongguang
Suopeian Tiaojie Chenggong [ST Hongguang Claim Case Successfully Mediated],
ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIES DAILY], Nov. 26, 2002, at 1.
152 See Michael Palmer, The Revival of Mediation in the People's Republic of
China: (2) JudicialMediation, in YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEM 145 (William
E. Butler ed. 1989); see also Weng Xiaobin, Lun Fayuan Tiaojie Zhidu Gaige [On
Reform of Judicial Mediation System], XIANDAI FAXUE [5 MODERN LAW SCIENCE] at 66
(2000).
153 See Fu Weiwei & Zhang Xuliang, Lun Xianxing Fayuan Tiaojie Zhidu de
Biduan he Gaige [On the Problem and Reform of Current JudicialMediation System],
FALU SHIYONG [4 LAW APPLICATION] at 12 (2000). To illustrate the point that the
judicial mediation system was seriously abused, the author cited an example: a total of
34,567 administrative cases were filed in 1994 to the people's courts at all levels of first
instant courts, out of which 15,317 (44%) were withdrawn as a result of judicial
mediation where plaintiffs were persuaded to withdraw their cases.
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on the role of judicial mediation by the Rules of the SPC may lead
to abuses of the proceedings by some local people's courts in
handling these types of cases. There are cases in which the parties
have settled their disputes under encouragement from the judges
and the cases have been withdrawn from the people's court.154 It
is still too early to say whether this is a positive development and
whether it is the future trend of private securities litigation in
China. It is certain that the people's courts and judges will follow
155
the Rules of the SPC to encourage parties to settle their disputes.
IV. Defendants' Liability and Compensation of Investors'
Losses
Any company, organization, or individual involved in making
false statements about the securities market is liable for the loss
suffered by investors as a result of those statements. 156 Different
rules apply to determine the liability of different defendants; some
are subject to strict liability, while others are subject to a faultbased liability. 157 Investor compensation for losses is limited to
the amount of the actual losses.'58 In order to claim compensation,
investors must first establish a causal link between false
statements and their losses. 159 The court then sets a cut-off date,
which determines a reasonable period for the calculation of losses,
154 Peng Miaoqiu, an investor from Shanghai, settled her case with Shanghai Jiabao
Industry (Group) Ltd. before Shanghai's Second Intermediate People's Court in
November 2002, the first such case concluded by a settlement between the parties. See
Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Shouqi Jiean Hejie Yuangao Huopei 800 yuan [The
First Securities Civil Compensation Case Concluded by Settlement with 800
yuan Compensation to the Plaintifi], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 15, 2002,
http://www.chinacourt.org [ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG].
In January 2003, another

sixteen plaintiffs settled their cases before the same people's court with the same
defendant company for a total of 61773.66 yuan. See ST Jiabao Xujia Chenshu An
Jiean-16 Wei Yuangao Huode Jingii Peichang Renminbi 61773.66 yuan [ST Jiabao
False Statement Case Concluded-16 Plaintiffs Got Economic Compensation 61773.66
yuan] ZHENGQUAN RIBAO [SECURITIES DAILY], Jan. 28, 2003, http://www.zqrb.com.cn.
155 See Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 4 (instructing local courts that they

should stress on mediation, and encourage parties to settle).
156 Id. arts. 7, 21-28.
157 Id. arts. 21-25. See infra Table 1. Parties Subject to Strict Liability, and Table 2.
Parties Subject to Fault-based Liability.
158 Id. art. 30.
159 Id. art. 18.
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and applies one of two different formulas to calculate actual losses
suffered. 160 These formulas depend upon the time when the
investors sold their affected securities. 161
A. Defendants' Liability
Issuers, listed companies, and their promoters (or controlling
shareholders) are central targets of the Rules of the SPC. The
Rules hold issuers or listed companies liable if they make false
statements and cause investor lOSS.1 62 Promoters are also liable
if they make false statements and cause losses to investors. 163
When promoters provide guarantees regarding the disclosures
made by issuers, they are jointly liable with those issuers."6 When
controlling shareholders165 manipulate issuers or listed companies
to violate securities law and make false statements using the
name of the issuers or listed companies, it can cause losses to
investors. These losses are to be compensated by the issuers or
listed companies. 66 These issuers or listed companies then claim
payment from the controlling shareholders or those who have actual
control over the company. 67 Where controlling shareholders or
those who have actual control over issuers or listed companies
make false statements, it constitutes a violation of Articles 4, 5,
and 188 of the 1998 Securities Law. 168 Because of the loss
incurred by the investors, the aforementioned responsible party

160 Id. art. 33.
161 See Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, arts. 31 and 32. See infra Table 6: Formulas

for the Calculation of Actual Losses.
162 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 21.
163 Id.

164 Id. art 26.
165 This also includes those who have actual control over issuers or listed
companies.
166 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 22.
167 Id.
168 Article 4 of the 1998 Securities Law emphasizes on the principle of good faith in
issuing and trading of securities, while Article 5 prohibits fraudulent and insider trading
and manipulation of the securities market. Article 188 states that anyone who disrupts
the order of the securities trading market by fabricating and disseminating false
information that affects securities trading shall be fined and subject to criminal liability
where applicable. See supra note 8.
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shall bear responsibilities to compensate investors. 169 Responsible
directors, supervisors, and managers of the issuers and listed
companies shall bear a joint liability for the losses caused by their
companies unless they can show that there is no fault on their
170
part.
Securities underwriters and securities listing sponsors who are
similarly involved in making false statements and causing losses
to investors bear liability for compensation, unless they can show
that it occurred through no fault on their part. 7 ' If they know or
ought to know of the false statement made by issuers or listed
companies, and neither correct them nor issued a statement of
reservation, they are regarded as having committed a common tort
(gongtong qinquan).17'2 Therefore, the securities underwriters and
securities listing sponsors bear joint liability with the issuers or
listed companies. 173 Moreover, responsible directors, supervisors,
and managers of securities underwriters and securities listing
sponsors bear a joint liability
with their companies unless they can
174
show no fault on their part.

Accounting firms, law firms, and asset valuation organizations
and their direct staffs are directly responsible and bear liability if
they are involved in making false statements. 175 The resulting
losses to investors are a violation of Article 161 and 202 of the
169 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 22.

Id.art. 21.
171 Id.art. 23.
172 Id.art. 27.
170

173 Id. Article 130 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law generally stipulates
that when two or more persons jointly infringe upon another person's rights and cause
him damage, all shall be jointly liable.
174 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 28.
175 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, arts. 24 and 7, 6. There is no provision in the
Rules of the SPC that defines "directly responsible persons" (zhijie zeren ren) of
professional intermediaries. From Article 7, Paragraph 6 of the Rules of the SPC where
it states: "responsible directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management
personnel of the issuers, listed companies, securities underwriters, or securities listing
sponsors; directly responsible persons of professional intermediaries," it could assume
that "directly responsible persons" of professional intermediaries would normally
include partners and senior management personnel of accountant firms, law firms, and
asset valuation organizations, equivalent to directors, supervisors, managers and other
senior management personnel of the issuers, listed companies, securities underwriters, or
securities listing sponsors. See supra note 45.
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1998 Securities Law.' 76 The absence of fault will again exculpate
those charged.'77 If accountant firms, law firms, or asset valuation
organizations know or ought to know the false statement made by
issuers or listed companies, but neither correct the statements nor
issue a statement of reservation, they will be regarded as
committing a common tort. 7 8 Therefore, they will bear a joint

liability with the issuers or listed companies. "9
Article 28 of the Rules of the SPC explains the circumstances
under which the responsible directors, supervisors, and managers
of issuers, listed companies, securities underwriters, and securities
listing sponsors are to be held liable for making false statements
jointly with their companies. 180 This includes: (1) participation in
making false statements; (2) knowing or having the responsibility
to know about the false statement but never making an objection;
and (3) all other circumstances under which they should bear
responsibility for the false statement and its effects.' 8 ' This last
"catch-all" provision 182 could lead the court to exercise its
discretion to hold directors, supervisors and managers of issuers,
listed companies, securities underwriters, and securities listing
sponsors liable for the false statement made by their companies.

176 Article 161 of the Securities Law imposes an obligation on professional
institutions and individuals who produce documents such as audit reports, asset appraisal
reports, and legal opinions for the issuance or listing of securities. They also impose an
obligation for securities trading activities to check and verify the truthfulness, accuracy,
and completeness of the contents of the reports to be produced by them. Furthermore,
they bear joint and several liability for the parts of such reports for which they are
responsible. Article 202 prescribes the penalties for the above professional institutions
and individuals if they make false statements, including confiscation of illegal gains,
fine, suspension of business, and disqualification, compensation for losses, and criminal
liability.
177 See Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 24.
178 Id. art. 27.
179 Id.

180 Id. art. 28.

181 Id. For a general discussion on liabilities of company directors to shareholders
for false statements, including the theoretical basis, constitutional element, behavior,
intention, and gross negligence, etc., see Cui Zhennan, Ma Mingsheng, Xujia Chenshu
Zhong Dongshi Dui Gudong Zheren Yanjiu [A Study on Liabilities of Directors to
Shareholdersfor False Statements], ZHONGGUO FAtJXE [2 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] at 96

(2003).
182 A typical provision found in other laws and regulations of the PRC.
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In total, promoters, issuers, listed companies, and their
controlling shareholders or those who exercise actual control over
the company are subject to a strict liability (see Table 1), while
securities underwriters, securities listing sponsors, accounting
firms, law firms, and asset valuation organizations are subject to a
liability based on fault (see Table 2). The same applies to
responsible directors, supervisors, managers of issuers, listed
companies, securities underwriters and securities listing sponsors,
and direct responsible persons of accounting firms, law firms, and
asset valuation organizations (see Table 2). Joint and several
liability applies to promoters; securities underwriters, securities
listing sponsors, accountant firms, law firms; and asset valuation
organizations, and directors, supervisors, managers of issuers,
listed companies, securities underwriters, and securities listing
sponsors (see Table 3). In addition, other organizations or
individuals who made false statements in violation of Articles 5,
72, 188, and 189 of the 1998 Securities Law 8 3 and cause losses to
investors are liable for compensation."8
The Rules of the SPC clarify some of the ambiguities found
in the provisions of the 1998 Securities Law as pertaining to
liabilities for making false and misleading statements. 185 Securities
underwriters and their responsible directors, supervisors, and
managers are now held liable under the Rules of the Provisions, on
the basis of fault liability. 186 Moreover, the same applies to
183 See Sec. Law, supra note 8, arts. 5, 72, 188, and 189. Information disseminated
by any mass medium is required to be truthful and objective according to the 1998
Securities Law. Any organization or individual is prohibited form fabricating and
disseminating false information or misleading information to affect securities trading.
This includes stock exchanges, securities companies, securities registration and clearing
institutions, securities trading service organizations, intermediary organizations,
securities associations and the securities regulatory authority, state functionaries, news
media, and their employees or staff members thereof and other persons concerned. The
penalties for violating organizations and individuals if they make false or misleading
statements, including fines, and additional administrative sanctions for state
functionaries and criminal liability. Id.; see also supra note 168.
184 See Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 7, 25.

185 These are the provisions in Articles 61, 161, and 202 of the 1998 Securities Law.
1998 Securities Law, supra note 8, art. 61, 161, and 202.
186 1998 Securities Law, supra note 8, art. 63. If an issuer or securities underwriter
announces a prospectus, measures for offer of corporate bonds, finance or accounting
report, listing document, annual report, interim report, or ad hoc report which contain or
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responsible directors, supervisors and managers of issuers, and
187
listed companies under Article 63 of the 1998 Securities Law.
The liability of accounting firms, law firms, asset valuation
organizations, and their staff members who would be directly
responsible is also interpreted as a fault liability under Articles 161
and 202 of the 1998 Securities Law. 188 The 1998 Securities Law
and the 1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and
Trading both contain provisions requiring companies applying
for listing, to submit to the CSRC and stock exchanges
recommendation letters from securities companies and members
of stock exchanges. 89 However, neither of the regulations have
provisions regarding the liability of securities companies for
making false statements in their capacity as securities listing
sponsors. 190 The Rules of the SPC now add securities listing
sponsors to the list of possible defendants.' 9' This details their
liability when making a false statement, which covers the
aforementioned omissions of the 1998 Securities Law and the
1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading. 192 It
is important to note that the Rules of the SPC include controlling
shareholders and those who have actual control over issuers or
listed companies in the list of possible defendants, holding them to
the standard of strict liability. 193

contains any false or misleading statement or major omission that causes investor losses
during the course of securities trading, the issuer or the underwriter shall be liable for the
losses. Also, the responsible director(s), supervisor(s), and/or the manager of the issuer
or the underwriter shall be jointly and severally liable for such losses.
187 Id.
188 Securities Law, supra note 8, arts. 161 and 202; supra note 176.
189 See Securities Law, supra note 8, art. 45.
190 See id. arts. 45 and 63.

191 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 7,

4, and arts. 23, 27, and 28.

192 See Jia Wei, supra note 46, at 9.
193 Id. Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 7,

1, and art. 22.
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Table 1. Parties Subject to Strict Liability
Promoters

Liable for losses caused to investors by their false
statements (Article 21)

Issuers

Liable for losses caused to investors by their false
statements (Article 21)

Listed companies

Liable for losses caused to investors by their false
statements (Article 21)

Controlling
shareholders
or
those who have
actual control over
issuers or listed
companies

1. Liable if they manipulate issuers or listed companies
and make false statements in violation of securities law
using the name of the issuers or listed companies and
cause losses to investors, which shall be compensated by
the issuers or listed companies first, who then make claims
from the controlling shareholders or those who have actual
control over the company (Article 22)
2. Liable if they make false statements in violation of
Article of 4, 5, and 188 of the 1998 Securities Law and
cause losses to investors (Article 22)

Table 2. Parties Subject to Fault-based Liability
Securities underwriters

Securities listing sponsors

Intermediaries (accountant
firms, law firms, asset
valuation organizations, and
their
direct
responsible
persons)
Responsible directors,
supervisors and managers of
issuers, listed companies,
securities underwriters, and
securities listing sponsors

Liable for the losses caused to investors by false
statements unless they can show that there is no
fault owing to them (Article 23)
Liable for the losses caused to investors by false
statements unless they can show that there is no
fault owing to them (Article 23)
Liable for the part for which they are
responsible if they make false statements in
violation of Article 161 and 202 of the 1998
Securities Law and cause losses to investors
unless they can show that there is no fault owing
to them (Article 24)
Bear a joint liability for the losses caused to
investors by their companies unless they can
show that there is no fault owing to them
(Articles 21, 23)
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Table 3. Parties Subject to Joint and Several Liability
Promoters

Liable jointly with issuers for the losses caused
to investors, if they provide guarantees for the
disclosure made by the issuers (Article 26)

Securities
underwriters,
securities listing sponsors,
accountant firms, law firms,
and
asset
valuation
organizations
Responsible directors,
supervisors and managers of
issuers, listed companies,
securities underwriters, and
securities listing sponsors

Liable jointly for the losses caused to investors,
if they know or ought to know the false
statement made by the issuer or listed company
but neither correct them nor issue a statement of
reservation (Article 27)
Liable jointly with their company for the losses
caused to investors if they:
1. Participate in making false statements;
2. Know or ought to know the false statement
but make no objections; and
3. Other circumstances under which they should
be held responsible (Articles 28)

There are valid criticisms and suggestive comments about the
provisions of the Rules of the SPC regarding defendants'
liabilities. In contrast to the view that securities underwriters and
their responsible directors, supervisors, and managers should be
held liable for false statements on a fault basis, some authors argue
that strict liability should be applied to securities underwriters in
the same way it applies to issuers.' 94 This is because the current
China securities market needs to strengthen and not weaken
underwriters' liabilities to prevent them from assisting issuers
from making false statements and harming investors. 195 Regarding
the application of fault liability, some authors criticize the Rules of
the SPC for not providing clear criteria by which to determine
fault. 196 These authors also suggest that the doctrine of duty of
care should be applied when determining the defendants' fault. 97

It is also argued that joint and several liability should not be
194 See Bai Yan, Fu Jun, Xujia Chenshu Qinquan de Peichang Zheren
[Compensation Liabilityfor the tort of False Statement], ZHONGGUO FAUXE [2 CHINA
LEGAL SCIENCE], at 104 (2003).
195 Id.
196 See Tu Binhua, supra note 66, at 94-95.
197 Id. at 95.
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strictly applied unless plaintiffs can prove that defendants acted
intentionally or conspired prior to their actions.'"
B. Causal Link between False Statement and Investors'
Losses
Defendants' liabilities are limited to actual losses suffered by
investors.' 99 For the calculation of actual losses, there first must
be a causal link (yinguo guanxi) between the false statement and
the loss suffered by investors. 200 To establish a causal link
between the false statement and investors' losses, the court must
find that: (1) the investments were securities directly connected
with the false statement; (2) the purchase date of the securities was
between the date on which the false statement is made and the date
on which the false statement is exposed or corrected; and (3) that
investors suffered losses as a result of selling securities on or after
the date on which the false statement was exposed or corrected, or
as a result of continued ownership of the securities after the false
statement was exposed or corrected.2 °'
The date on which the false statement is exposed (xujia
chenshu jieluri) refers to the date it is first exposed by the mass
media that is circulated or broadcasted nationwide, such as
newspapers, radio, or television.0 2 The dates on which the false
statement is corrected (xujia chenshu gengzhengri) refers to the
date that the person who made the false statement voluntarily
corrects it and communicates the connection to the public through
the media. 203 This correction shall adhere to regulatory formalities
for the suspension of trading, and it shall be broadcast through the
media designated by the CSRC. 20 4 Although the Internet is not
mentioned by the Rules of the SPC, it should presumably be
treated as a platform for the purpose of the application of the
Rules. 20 5 The date on which the false statement is made, exposed,
198 Id.
199 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 30.
200 Id. art. 18.

201 Id. art. 18, [ 1-3.
202 Id. art. 20.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 National newspapers and specialist securities newspapers are now found online,
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or corrected is crucial when determining the causal link between
the false statement and investors' losses-this, in turn, determines
whether an investor is entitled to compensation. °6
Table 4 illustrates this causal link with an example of a listed
company who has a share listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange on
July 1, 2003, makes a false statement on July 1, 2003, and is
exposed (or corrected) on July 31, 2003. Investor A, B, C, and D
purchased and sold the company's shares on different dates. In
accordance with the Rules of the SPC, Investors A and B are
entitled to claim compensation as there is a causal link between
the false statement and their losses. Investors C nor D could not
establish a causal link or claim compensation as well, even though
they may have suffered losses as a result of the false statement.
Table 4. Causal Link between False Statement (FS) and Investors'
Losses
Investor June 2003
A

July 1, 2003:
FS made

B

C

Purchased
on June 30

D

July 31, 2003:
July 2-30,
FS exposed
2003
or corrected
Aug. 2003
Purchased Sold on July
Sold on Aug.
on July2 31 and suffered 15,20, and28, "I

and 30

loss

respectively,
and suffered
loss

Purchased
on July 2

Held until
July 31 and

Still holding
and suffered

and 30
Sold on
July 30
Purchased

suffered loss

loss

on July 2

and sold
on July

30

for example,

DAILY] (http://www.people.com.cn) and
(http://www.zqrb.com.cn.).
206 See Zhang Yongjian, Lun Xujia Chenshu Qinquan Xingwei de Jige Shijiandian
[On Several Dates Concerning the Tort of False Statement], FALU SHIYONG [4
APPLICATION OF LAW] at 13-16 (2003) (analyzing these dates).
RENMIN

RIBAO

[PEOPLE's

ZHENGQUAN RIBAO [SECURrrIEs DAILY]

X
X
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Academics, practitioners, and judges have criticized these
causation rules as cumbersome because they require the plaintiff
to have purchased shares in reliance on false statements as shown
by purchasing them after the statement was made. 207 These rules
also require the plaintiff to sell or continue to hold the shares until
after the false statement has been publicly exposed or corrected.2 8
Some criticize the rules on the grounds that false statements can be
optimistic or pessimistic statements (youduo or youkong) and
either may purposely defraud the market and investors. In one
such example, the purpose of a false pessimistic press release
issued by one listed company was to benefit the directors and
senior management members by allowing them to have a low
stock option exercise price. 209 Thus, arguments show that it is
incorrect to presume that no causal link exists if investors sell their
securities before the exposure or correction day. 210 These
causation rules should be interpreted more widely in order to reach
situations in which investors are misled by fraudulent pessimistic
statements and suffer losses as a result.2 t Some criticize the rules
from a market practice point of view. They argue that, often
before a false statement is exposed, rumors start to appear on the
market and prices start to fall; therefore, it is unfair to exclude
those investors who sell their securities and suffer losses in order
to stop falling prices before the exposure day.212 These critics

207 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 18.
208 Id.
209 See Guiping Lu, supra note 65, at 803-04 (explaining that the author uses this

hypothetical situation to argue that the provisions of the Rules of the SPC deny recovery
to investors who are in the same situation as the investor in this hypothetical situation,
and who also suffered losses as a result of the listed company's false pessimistic press

release).
210 See Guo Feng, supra note 41, at 99.
211 See Sheng Huanwei & Zhu Chuan, supra note 71, at 102 (arguing that Article 18
of the Rules of the SPC only applies to optimistic false statements, but that there is a

need for judges to interpret this rule more broadly in order to apply it to pessimistic false
statements); see also Yin Jie, supra note 65, at 112 (arguing that at present, all of the

cases brought to court are cases involving optimistic false statements made to enlarge
profits and conceal losses; however, as the market develops and becomes more
sophisticated, pessimistic false statements are inevitable and investors will be affected by

them).
212 Jiao Jinhong, "Qizha Shichang Lilun" Yanjiu [On the "Fraud on the Market
Theory"], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [2 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] at 114 (2003).
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suggest that a flexible criterion such as "the date on which false
statements are widely known by the market and investors" should
replace the current rigid requirement of "the date on which false
statements are exposed for the first time by national newspapers,
radio, or [television] .'213
Article 18 of the Rules of the SPC does not require investors to
prove that a causal link exists between their investment and the
false statement.2 14 If they can show that they purchased relevant
securities after the date on which the false statement is made and
that they sold or held them until after the public exposure or
correction of the false statement, then they have established
a causal link.215 In other words, the court assumes that all
the investors who purchase relevant securities during the
prescribed period have made their investment in reliance on the
false statement and thus are affected. These investors are then
exempted from proving a causal link. 216 The presumption of
reliance can be rebutted if defendants prove one of the following:
(1) the plaintiff sold the relevant securities before the date on
which the false investment was exposed or corrected; (2) the
plaintiff purchased the relevant securities on the date on which the
false statement was exposed or corrected or thereafter; (3) the
plaintiff knew the existence of the false statement but nevertheless
made the investment; (4) all or part of the losses suffered by the
plaintiff were caused by other risk elements of the securities
market; or (5) the plaintiff made the investment in bad faith in
order to manipulate the price of the securities. 217 The defense of
"other risk elements of the securities market" may be problematic
because it is difficult for defendants to prove such risks to the
court. 218 In other words, it is difficult for the defense to discharge
their burden of proof that the losses of investors are caused by
other market risk elements-specifically, proving that the loss was

213 Id.

214 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 18.
215 Id. art. 18,

1-3.

216 Rules of the SPC supra note 3, art. 18; Kong Lin & Ye Jun, supra note 71, at 23,
Guiping Lu, supra note 65, at 804 (discussing fraud on the market theory in the United
States and its influence on the Rules of the SPC).
217 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 19.
218 See Jiao Jinhong, supra note 212, at 114.
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not caused by their false statement. It is suggested that a system
should be established that enables expert witnesses to appear
regularly before the court to assist judges when making this
decision. 219 Given that the "other risk element" defense is often
replied upon by defendants, the use of expert witnesses and quality
evidence
will assist in the decision-making process of the people's
220
court.

C. Calculationof Actual Losses of Investors
There are three aspects to actual losses (shiji shunshi) suffered
by investors resulting from false statements: (1) the difference of
their investment; (2) the commission, charge, and stamp duty
connected with their lost investment; and (3) the interest lost for
their investment as calculated according to bank deposit rates for
the relevant period. 22 To calculate the loss actually suffered by
investors, the court must first determine a date (jizhunri) upon
which the calculation is based.22 Article 33 of the Rules of the
SPC provides the following guidelines for the court to determine
such a cut-off date. 223 It is defined as a date prescribed to
determine a reasonable period for the calculation of losses, thus
limiting the compensation to investors for the losses caused by
false statements.224
First, the cut-off date should be the date on which aggregated
trading volumes of the security affected by the false statement
reach 100% of its tradable volumes. 225 This is after the date when
the false statement is exposed or corrected, disregarding all large
volume trading through agreements. Second, if the court is unable
to determine the cut-off date in accordance with the above
219 Id.
220 See Liaoning Shouli Zhengquan Xujia Chenshu Peichang An Zuori Kaishen
[Liaoning's First Securities False Statement Compensation Case Started Hearing
Yesterday], July 25, 2003, http://www.chinacourt.org [ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG],
Gumin Zhuanggao Shangshi Gongsi Dongshizhang Suopei 9 Wan [Shareholder Sue

Directorof Listed Company for 90 Thousand], July 9, 2003, http://www.chinacourt.org
[ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG] (relying upon other risk elements as a defense).
221 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 33.
222

Id. art. 33.

223

Id. art. 33, I 1-4.

224 Id. art. 33.
225

id. art. 33, T 1.
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criterion before the hearing, the cut-off date should be the thirtieth
trading date after the false statement is exposed or corrected. 2 6
Third, where the security affected has been de-listed from the
trading market, the cut-off date should be the trading day
preceding the day that the security was de-listed.2 7 Fourth, where
the security affected has been suspended from trading, the cut-off
date should be the trading day preceding the day that the trading of
the security was suspended.228 Finally, where the trading has been
restored, the cut-off date should be determined in accordance with
the aggregated trading volumes of the affected security as
mentioned above.229
Table 5 takes the same example used in Table 4230 to illustrate
the cut-off date determined in accordance with the guidelines set
out by Article 33 of the Rules of the SPC. 231' Depending upon the
position of the defendant company, 232 there could be four cut-off
dates.
As shown in Table 5, the primary method used by the court to
determine the cut-off date is aggregation of trading volumes of the
security affected by the false statement. The cut-off date is
calculated as when the aggregated trading volume of the security
affected by the false statement reaches 100% of its tradable
volume, after the date on which the false statement was exposed or
corrected.23 3 Scholars have expressed views that this method may

not necessarily reflect the true picture of market demand and
2 34
supply movements when the market, as a whole, is improving.
226 Id. art. 33,T2.

227 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, at art. 33,
228 Id. art. 33,

3.

T 4.

229 Id.

230 See Table 4: Causal Link between False Statement and Investors' Losses.
231 Compare Rules of the SPC, supra note 3 (showing no clear indication as to

whether or not to disregard a public holiday when calculating the thirtieth trading day),
with General Provisions of Civil Law, art. 154 (1986) (P.R.C.) (providing that if the last
day of a time period falls on a Sunday or an official holiday, the day after the holiday
shall be taken as the last day).
232 The position of trading volumes of the defendant company's share, and whether
the share is de-listed or suspended. See infra Table 5: Cut-off Date for the Calculation of
Actual Losses of Investors.
233 The Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 33 (1).
234

See Guo Feng, supra note 41, at 99.
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Instead, it would be proper to take an average closing price of each
trading day during a reasonable bounce back period as the basis
for calculation of losses.235 Others argue that this method is
vulnerable to abuse, because those who make the false statements
may use illegal means to manipulate the trading volumes.23 6 When
this happens, the calculation of investors' losses would be
affected.2 37
On the basis of the cut-off date, two different formulas are
available to calculate actual losses suffered by the investors
depending on if or when they sold their securities prior to or after
the cut-off date. 238 For those investors who sold their securities on
or prior to the cut-off date, actual losses are determined by
multiplying the number of securities they held by the difference
between the average purchase price and the actual price by which
they sold their securities. 239 For those investors who sold their
securities after the cut-off date or continued to hold them, actual
losses are calculated by multiplying the number of securities they
hold by the difference between their average purchase price and
the average closing prices of every trading day from the date when
the false statement was exposed or corrected, until the cut-off
date.240

235 Id. at 99.
236 See Song Yixing, supra note 62, at 10.

237 Id. at 10.
238 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, arts. 31 and 32; see Wang Dan, Zhengquan Xujia
Chenshu Peichang Jishuan Fangfa Lun [On the Method for the Calculation of
Compensationfrom Securities-relatedFalse Statements], FAXUE [6 LEGAL SCIENCE] at
103-108 (2003) (discussing these formulae and other calculation method in general).
239 Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 31.
240 Id. art. 32.
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Table 5. Cut-off Date for the Calculation of Actual Losses of
Investors

Determined
by aggregated
trading
volumes

July 31,
2003:
False
statement
exposed or
corrected
Trading
volumes of
defendant
company's
share at
50%

Aug. 20,
2003:
Cut-off
date
Trading
volumes of
defendant
company's
share has
been
aggregated
to 100%

Aug. 24,
2003:
Cut-off
date

Court unable
to determine
by trading
volumes

Where
defendant
company's
share has
been
de-listed
Where
defendant
company's
share has
been
suspended
Where
defendant
company' s
share has
been
restored after
suspension

Aug. 30,
2003:
Cut-off
date

Sept. 15,
2003:
Cut-off
date

30th trading
date after the
date when
the false
statement
was exposed
or corrected
Preceding
de-listing
day

Preceding
suspension
day

Trading
volumes of
defendant
company's
share has
been
accumulated
to 100%
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Table 6. Formulas for the Calculation of Actual Losses
July 31,
2003:
False

July 1,
2003:

Aug.
20,

False

statement

2003:

Aug.

Investors' actual

statement

exposed or

Cut-off

28,

losses
Investor A:
Average
purchase price
15 yuan minors
average selling
price 4 yuan =
11 yuan x 200 =
2200 yuan

made

date

2003

corrected

Purchased 200
shares on July 2
at 10 yuan per
share, and
another 200
shares on 30
July at 20 yuan
per share. Total:

Sold 100
shares on
July 31 at
6 yuan per
share

6000 yuan for
400 shares

Investor A:
Average
purchase price
15 yuan minors
average price of
closing prices of
each trading day
3.3 yuan = 11.7

Same as above

Share
price 7
yuan at
close of
trading

Sold
50
shares
on
Aug.
15 at 3
yuan
per

Sold
50
shares
on
Aug.
20 at 1
yuan
per

share

share

Share
price 2
yuan at
close
of
trading

Share
price 1
yuan at
close
of
trading

yuan x 200 =

per

2340 yuan

share

Investor B:
Average
purchase price
15 yuan minors
average price of
closing prices of
each trading day

Purchased on 2 Price at 7
July 100 shares
yuan per
at 10 yuan per
share at
share, and on 30 the close
July 100 shares of trading
at 20 yuan per
share. Total:

Price
at 2
yuan
per
share
at the
close

Price
at 1
yuan
per
share
at the
close

3.3 yuan = 11.7

3000 yuan for

of

of

yuan x 200

200 shares

trading trading

=2340 yuan

Sold
200
shares
on
Aug.
28 at
2.50
yuan

I

Still
holding
200
shares

N.C. J.
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Table 6 illustrates an application of these two different
formulas to calculate the actual losses of Investors A and B of the
defendant company. Suppose the court determined the cut-off
date as August 20, 2003, in accordance with an aggregated trading
volume of the defendant company's share. The actual losses of
Investor A who bought 400 shares with 6,000 yuan and sold them
both before and after the cut-off date are 4,540 yuan in total.
Investor B who bought 200 shares with 3,000 yuan and still holds
them after the cut-off date has an actual loss of 2,340 yuan.
D. Compensation of Investors' Losses
The combined effect of these rules can be determined by
carefully following the causal link between actual losses, the cutoff date, and the calculation formulas. First, only those investors
who purchase affected securities after a false statement is made,
and before the false statement is exposed or corrected, and who
then sell the affected securities or continue to hold them after the
false statement is exposed or corrected, are entitled to claim
compensation for the losses they suffered. Second, investor
plaintiffs would not be able to claim compensation if defendants
could prove: (1) that the plaintiffs purchased or sold the securities
outside, the period prescribed by the Rules of the SPC; (2) their
losses were caused by other risk elements of the market; (3) they
had knowledge of the false statement but nevertheless made an
investment; (4) or they made the investment in bad faith in order
to manipulate the market. Third, those plaintiffs who have
satisfied the causal link test and are entitled to compensation,
including the following reimbursements: (1) the difference of their
investments; (2) the commission charges and stamp duties
connected with their lost investments; and (3) interests of their
losses calculated against bank interest rates for deposit for the
affected period. 24' Finally, depending upon whether the plaintiffs
241 The Rules of the SPC do not provide further guidelines as to how the
commissions, charges, and stamp duties are calculated. Rules of the SPC, supra note 3.
Presumably, in accordance with the principle of "actual loss", the calculation would be
based on what investors have paid for commissions and stamp duties connected with
their lost investment. Starting from January 24, 2005, the rate of stamp duty for
securities trading is 0.1%. See Circular of the Ministry of Finance and the State Bureau
of Taxation on Adjustment of Securities Trading Stamp Duties, issued on, and effective
from, January 24, 2005. Starting from May 1, 2002, the commission that securities
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sell the effected securities before or after the cut-off date, their lost
investment is calculated by: multiplying the number of securities
they hold by either the difference between the average purchase
price and the actual price at which the securities were sold, or the
difference between the average purchase price and the average
closing prices of every trading day from the date when the false
statement is exposed or corrected until the cut-off date.
Some authors believe that the scope of compensation
prescribed by the Rules of the SPC is too narrow and should be
enlarged to include indirect losses or expenses of investors.242
They argue that only by such an enlargement of the scope of
compensation could victim investors be made whole, as if the false
statement had not happened. 243 These authors assert that this
complies with the general fairness principle of civil law, and
prevents the occurrence of false statements by increasing the cost
of making false statements. 244 For other authors, the compensation
provisions of the Rules of the SPC already comply with the
fairness principle of civil law since they define a scope of actual
losses for investors while not imposing any extra burden on
defendants.245 They argue that this is consistent with China's
current conditions on the securities market with respect to the
protection of investors.246
In contrast to the provisions of the Rules of the SPC regarding
the calculation of investors' losses on the securities trading
market, the Rules of the SPC give little attention to the calculation
of investors' losses on the securities issuing market, a shortcoming

houses charge investors for the trading of A share, B share and investment funds may not
be higher than 0.3% of the trading amount in question. See Circular of the CSRC, the
State Commission for Development and Planning and State Bureau of Taxation on
Adjustment of Commissions Charged for Securities Trading, issued on April 4, 2002,
and effective from May 1, 2002.
242 See Yin Jie, supra note 65, at 112; Bai Yan & Fu Jun, supra note 194, at 101.
This would include the subscription of affected securities expense, the litigation expense
(including fees for lawyers and courts), all traveling expenses, and the lost salaries
resulting from attendance at the litigation.
243 Bai Yan & Fu Jun, supra note 194, at 100.
244

Id. at 101.

245

See Guo Feng, supra note 41, at 99.

246

Id.
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that some regard as a significant failure.2 47 Article 29 of the Rules

of the SPC simply states that where investors suffered losses as a
result of false statements made on the securities issuing market,
they are entitled to compensation from wrongdoers in accordance
with Article 30 of the Rules of the SPC. 248 Additionally, where the
false statement leads to a cancellation of the issue of securities,
investors are entitled to a refund of their money plus interest
calculated according to bank deposit interest rates for the same
period. The calculation formula for losses occurring on the
securities trading market under Article 30 may, to certain extent,
apply to the calculation of the losses occurring on the issuing
market. However, as the circumstances on the issuing market are
different from those on the trading market, it is necessary for the
Rules of the SPC to provide a set of detailed guidelines separately
governing the calculation of the losses occurring on the issuing
market. 249 As pointed out by one practicing lawyer, another
omission in the Rules of the SPC that may cause serious problem
in practice is a lack of more detailed guidelines on the practical
determination of the false statement date, the exposure or
correction date, and the cut-off date.2150 Every single alternation of
these crucial dates may lead to a large scale increase or decrease in
compensation figures.25'
V. Summary: Limitations of the Rules of the SPC
The SPC took the unprecedented step of issuing three circulars
within a short period of time-from September 2001 to January
2003-giving instructions to local people's courts on how to
handle civil compensation claims arising from securities fraud on
China's securities market. 52 This demonstrated that the SPC was,
on one hand, under unavoidable pressure from the public to issue
247 See Tu Binhua, supra note 66, at 93.

Rules of the SPC, supra note 3, art. 29.
249 See Tu Binhua, supra note 66, at 93 (discussing the way different situations in
the securities-issue market affect false statement makers' liability and the compensation
of damages).
250 See Song Yixing, supra note 62, at 9-10. Song Yixing is a practicing lawyer
from Shanghai Wenda Law Firm.
251 Id. at 10.
248

252 See supra note 1.
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guidelines for the people's court to deal with such cases; on the
other hand, the SPC was reluctant to make the people's court fully
open and available for such cases due to social, political, legal, and
other reasons. Although the current Rules of the SPC are
generally welcomed by lawyers, academics, and investors at large,
they nevertheless fall short of expectations. Indeed, the SPC and
the Rules of the SPC could not surpass the limit of the second
circular on certain key issues. Under these circumstances, it is
unrealistic to expect that the SPC may make any radical moves.
The Rules of the SPC, as discussed above, must inevitably be
limited in regards to the following key issues.
First, the Rules of the SPC limit the scope of cases that will be
accepted and heard by the people's court. Compared with the
second circular, the Rules of the SPC are a positive step towards
allowing criminal court judgments and the penalty decisions of
other administrative authorities-besides the CSRC-to be used to
accept cases for the people's court. However, the prerequisite rule
set out effectively limits the scope of cases to be accepted and
heard by the people's court. In addition, the Rules of the SPC
only apply to the cases arising from false statements, which now
excludes from the people's court civil actions related to insider
trading or market manipulation. Social, political, legal, and
procedural criticisms of this prerequisite rule point to this defect
and show that it is an unpopular provision of the Rules of the SPC.
Second, the Rules of the SPC limit the eligibility of
shareholder investors to receive compensation of losses suffered as
a result of false statements. The Rules of the SPC do not
discriminate against any group of shareholder investors or any
individual, legal person, or other organization who subscribes and
trades securities on the securities market established by the
government. They have the right to file a case in the people's
court and seek compensation if they suffer losses as a result of a
false statement. However, the actual provisions of the Rules of the
SPC concerning causal links actually limit the eligibility of
shareholder investors for the compensation of their losses. In
effect, all the shareholder investors who purchase or sell affected
securities at times other than those prescribed by the Rules of the
SPC are excluded from the scope of compensation regardless of
whether or not they suffered losses.
Third, the Rules of the SPC fail to provide shareholder
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investors with a helpful and effective procedure by which they
may access the court and judicial remedies. Lawyers will face
unpredicted difficulties bringing their cases to the people's court
in a timely and efficient manner. Many factors contribute to this
difficulty: (1) the Rules of the SPC's cautiously chosen form of
joint action for investors to bring their lawsuits; (2) a limited
number of intermediate people's courts designated by the Rules of
the SPC in contrast to a large number of potential lawsuits; (3) a
priority given to the intermediate people's courts located at the
places of issuer or listed company defendants; and (4) the Rules of
the SPC lack provisions on the determination and calculation of
losses suffered on the issuing market and on the practical
determination of the false statement date and other crucial dates.
These factors combine to hamper lawyers' abilities to reliably
obtain compensation for every shareholder investor who suffers a
loss as a result of the false statement.
Fourth, the Rules of the SPC play only a limited role in
assisting the prevention of market abuse and the regulation of
China's securities market. There is no doubt that the Rules of the
SPC, by prescribing a specific and wide-ranging list of possible
defendants and their corresponding liabilities-particularly
targeting issuers, listed companies, and their promoters or
controlling shareholders-will have a positive impact on the
corporate governance and the regulation of China's securities
market as a whole. However, there are a limited number of cases
tried by the people's court and a limited number of investors who
are eligible for compensation. The way in which actual losses are
calculated, as well as the potential consequence of the prerequisite
rule that defendants may interfere with administrative
investigation process in order to escape civil penalties, means that
the application of the Rules of the SPC would not bring about
substantial costs for defendants. Therefore, this would not
effectively deter them from making false statements on the
securities market.
In conclusion, the Rules of the SPC are a first and important
step towards the establishment of a civil litigation and
compensation system to address securities fraud cases on China's
securities market by the people's court. However, it fails to
surpass its predecessors and transcend their limitations. Though
the SPC may find it difficult, a balance must be struck between the
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court, the government, social stability, 253 the protection and

development of state-owned listed companies, and the need to
protect and compensate all investors who suffer losses as a result
of securities frauds. In addition, the gaps and defects of the
current primary legislations also contributes to the limitations of
the Rules of the SPC. Nevertheless, the system established by the
Rules of the SPC has brought securities civil litigation arising
from false statements in China to a new stage of evolution.
Further changes and improvements are still necessary in order for
the system to operate effectively. It is hoped that the forthcoming
amendments of the 1998 Securities Law 254 will improve securities
civil litigation as a whole in China, so that the law can play an
important and necessary role in the protection of the rights and
interests of investors and the promotion of the sound development
of China's securities market.

253 See Yang Wei & Pan Jing, Li Guoguang: Zhua Shenpan Bao Wending Shi
Fayuan Shouyao Renwu [Li Guoguang: To Work on Adjudication and to Protect Social
Stability is the First and Important Task of the People's Court], Sept. 15, 2002,
http://www.chinacourt.org (where Li Guoguang-deputy president of the Supreme
People's Court, speaking at a meeting on the trial of civil compensation cases arising
from false statements on the securities market on September 12-14, 2002, in Lanzhou
city, Gansu province-emphasized that protecting social stability is the first and most
important task of the people's court).
254 It was announced by the Financial and Economic Committee of the NPC on July
18, 2003, that a working team had been set up to start the work of amending the 1998
Securities Law. See Zhengquanfa Xiugai Zhengshi Qidong [The Work of Amending the
Securities Law formally Start], ZHENGQUAN RIBAO [SECURITIES DAILY], July 19, 2003,
http://www.zqrb.com.cn.
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